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INTRODUCTION
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 prohibits the unauthorized interception of oral
and wire communications except pursuant to a court order.'
This statute "represents a comprehensive attempt by Congress
to promote more effective control of crime while protecting the
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A. 1964, LL.B. 1967, Yale
University. The author is indebted to the Old Gold Foundation of the University of
Iowa, under the auspices of whose summer fellowship program he prepared this
article. He also would like to thank the several members of the faculty at the Univer-
sity of Iowa. Law School who read and commented on the article in manuscript
form. He is grateful as well to Attorney James Jay Hogan, who started the whole
thing, see note 24 infra, and who kindly provided copies of unreported court deci-
sions and other relevant documents.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). There are several exceptions to Title III's pro-
hibition of unauthorized electronic interceptions. The statute does not apply, for
example, if a party to the wire or oral communication consents to its interception.
Id. § 2511(2)(c). Cf United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971). But cf. Arnold
v. County Court, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 442-43, 187 N.W.2d 354, 358-59 (1971). Nor does
the statute apply to the interception of oral communications in which the participants
have no reasonable expectation of privacy. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1970); cf. United
States v. Banks, 374 F. Supp. 321, 327 (D.S.D. 1974). Compare United States v. Hall,
488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973), and United States v. Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d 1202 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974), with North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d
301, 502 P.2d 1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972). Congress also excluded from the
statute's coverage whatever constitutional authority the President may possess to
employ electronic interceptions to protect the nation's security against foreign or
domestic threats. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970). In United States v. United States Dis-
trict Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the Supreme Court ruled without dissent that the
President's constitutional powers did not include authority to employ electronic
surveillances to protect the nation from domestic violence or subversion without prior
judicial approval. Id. at 320-21. The Court carefully refrained from considering
whether the same fourth amendment requirement would apply in the case of a
foreign threat. Id. at 321-22. Some lower courts believe prior judicial approval would
not be necessary in such cases. United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973);
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1973); cf. United States v. Butenko, 494
F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974). But cf. Russo v. Byrne, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29
(D.D.C. 1974). Title III also permits communications common carriers to intercept
and disclose wire communications in connection with the rendition of service or the
protection of the carrier's rights or property. 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(a) (1970). See United'
States v. Freeman, 373 F. Supp. 50 (S.D. Ind. 1974).
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privacy of individual thought and expression. ' 2 It sets forth an
elaborate statutory procedure-intended to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment 3-by which federal and state officials can obtain
court orders to conduct electronic surveillances in certain rela-
tively serious cases.4 In exercising their judicial responsibilities
2 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972).
3 United States 'v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United
States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974);
United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1109-10 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See S. REP.
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2113, 2153, 2161-63
[hereinafter cited as S. REP., with pagination cited to 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws].
Virtually every court which has considered the constitutionality of Title III has
sustained the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 773-75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
866 (1973); United States v. Bobo, supra at 981; United States v. Cafero, supra at 501;
United States v. Cox, supra at 1304. Contra, United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp.
358 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
For discussions of the constitutionality of Title III, see Burpo, Electronic Surveillance
by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case for the Prosecution, 38 TENN. L. REV. 14 (1970);
Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order",
67 MNcsH. L. REV. 455 (1969); Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate:
The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969); Note, Federal Decisions on the
Constitutionality of Electronic Surveillance Legislation, 11 Am. CRUm. L.Q. 639 (1973).
4 Title III permits federal courts to authorize or approve electronic interceptions
which constitute or may constitute evidence of certain specified federal crimes. 18
U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970). The statute contemplates that under most conditions the court
will issue the interception order before the interceptions occur. In emergency situa-
tions involving national security or organized crime, law enforcement officials may
conduct electronic surveillances without a prior court order provided that they obtain
judicial approval within 48 hours. Id. § 2518(7). See Note, Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance-Title III of the Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 319, 350-66
(1969). Although the statute requires interception orders to specify the type of com-
munications to be intercepted, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4)(a), (c) (1970), it permits the inter-
ception and use of communications not described in the court order if those com-
munications relate to criminal activity for which an interception order could issue. Id.
§ 2517(5). The courts have sustained the constitutionality of this provision by analogy
to the plain view doctrine, United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 686-87 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972), or by characterizing criminal conversations as the
equivalent of contraband, United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972).
See S. REP., supra note 3, at 2189.
When the government seeks authority to intercept communications relating to a
crime specified in the statute, Title III permits a federal judge to issue an order au-
thorizing the interception only upon a detailed showing that probable cause exists to
believe that the subjects of the proposed surveillance are committing or have com-
mitted that crime and that the surveillance will intercept communications relating to
the offense. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(3)(a), (b), (d) (1970). In addition, the issuing court
must find that the use of other investigative techniques to obtain the necessary evidence
is unlikely to succeed or is too dangerous. Id. § 2518(3)(c).
Title III also requires each interception order to include various provisions in-
tended to limit the scope and duration of the electronic surveillance to the circum-
stances justifying its use. S. REP., supra note 3, at 2192-93. The order must specify the
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under Title III, courts have frequently remarked on the extra-
ordinary invasion of individual privacy made possible by elec-
tronic surveillance, and have asserted that no such invasions
maximum period during which communications may be intercepted, in no case to
exceed 30 days, and must provide that the electronic surveillance must cease as soon
as the government intercepts the communications specified in the statute. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2518(4)(e), (5) (1970). Commonly, however, such orders permit the government to
continue its interceptions until it has secured sufficient evidence to identify all the
participants in a criminal venture and the full scope of their operations. See, e.g., United
States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019-20 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Cox, 462
F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); cf. United States
v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972). The government also
can obtain extension orders permitting interceptions to continue after the original
order lapses, although whether a further showing of probable cause is necessary is
unclear. See United States v. Poeta, supra.
Each Title III court order must provide that the authorized electronic surveillance
will commence as soon as practicable and will be conducted so as to minimize the
interception of communications not subject to interception under the statute. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(5) (1970). The issuing judge also may require the government to make periodic
reports during the duration of the surveillance in order to indicate progress made
and the need for continued interception. Id. § 2518(6); S. REP., supra note 3, at 2192-93.
See United States v. Cox, supra at 1301; United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863,
872-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 306-07 (S.D. Fla.
1971). The minimization requirement of § 2518(5) serves to prevent Title III elec-
tronic interceptions from constituting a general search in violation of the fourth
amendment. United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 532 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd in
part, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Sklaroff,
supra at 306; S. REP., supra note 3, at 2192. However, the lower courts have interpreted
those requirements in significantly different fashions. Some courts believe that the
failure to minimize the interception of innocent communications requires the sup-
pression of all intercepted communications, including those which constitute evi-
dence of crime. United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971). Other courts are more tolerant of the inter-
ception of innocent communications and even in the case of unjustifiable failures to
minimize interceptions will suppress only non-incriminatory communications. See,
e.g., United States v. Cox, supra; United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408 (D. Md.
1972); United States v. Mainello, supra; United States v. king, supra; Spease v. State,
319 A.2d 560 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974). See Note, Minimization of Wire Interception:
Presearch Guidelines and Postsearch Remedies, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1411 (1974); Note,
Minimization: In Search of Standards, 8 SUFF. U.L. REV. 60 (1973).
In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967), the Supreme Court condemned
a state wiretapping statute on multiple grounds including the absence of any require-
ment that applications demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying the failure to
give prior notice. Title III purports to avoid this constitutional deficiency in two ways.
First, it requires a showing of necessity. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1970). Electronic inter-
ceptions are permissible under the statute only when they provide the sole reasonably
available means to obtain the necessary evidence. United States v. Sklaroff, supra at
307-08. See S. REP., supra note 3, at 2190; A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 137-40 (Tent.
Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE]. Second, Title III also requires the issuing court to order post-inter-
ception notice that surveillance occurred. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970). Only those
individuals who were identified as subjects of the surveillance are entitled to such
notice automatically. Others whose communications were intercepted are not entitled
to notice under § 2518(8)(d) unless the issuing judge concludes in his discretion that
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are lawful unless conducted in strict compliance with the pro-
visions of the statute.5
One of the statutory requirements for federal government
attorneys who wish to seek a court order permitting electronic
interceptions is first to obtain the approval of "the Attorney
General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially desig-
nated by the Attorney General. '6 When applying to a federal
judge for a Title III order, the government attorney also must
state under oath the name of the individual who authorized
the application; the federal judge must identify that official
as "the authorizing officer" in the court order itself.7
notice would be appropriate. See United States v. Forlano, 358 F. Supp. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); United States v. Ripka, 349 F. Supp. 539, 541-42 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 480 F.2d
919 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 977 (1973). Although the government may not dis-
pense altogether with the service of notice, suppression will not follow if the govern-
ment fails to give notice within the 90-day period specified by the statute. Compare
United States v. Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972), with United States v. Wolk, 466
F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Smith, 463 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1972)
(alternative holding); and United States v. Forlano, supra. Furthermore, as the sec-
tion permits, courts will postpone the service of notice if circumstances constituting
good causes so require. United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
United States v. Cantor, 328 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 890 (3d Cir.
1972). See S. REP., supra note 3, at 2194.
5 Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972); United States v. King, 478
F.2d 494, 503 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d
679, 684 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Mainello,
345 F. Supp. 863, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Baldassari, 338 F. Supp. 904,
905-07 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
6 The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially desig-
nated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal
Judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity
with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving the inter-
ception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, or a Federal agency having responsibility for the investigation of
the offense as to which the application is made.
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970). Section 2516(2) similarly restricts electronic interceptions
by state officials, permitting only the chief prosecuting attorney of the state, or a
political subdivision thereof, to apply to state courts for interception orders. See also
S. REP., supra note 3, at 2187.
The relevant provisions of section 2518 are:
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception
of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or af-
firmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant's
authority to make the application. Each application shall include the following
information:
(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the application, and the officer authorizing the application.
(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or
oral communication shall specify-
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communica-
tions and of the person authorizing the application.
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The legislative history of the electronic surveillance stat-
ute8 makes the purpose of these provisions reasonably ap-
parent: Congress wanted a politically accountable official to
formulate Justice Department policies for the use of electronic
surveillance techniques and to decide whether those policies
required electronic intrusions in each individual case. 9 The
Attorney General and his Assistant Attorney General are, of
course, among the most senior officials of the Justice Depart-
ment. They are also politically accountable in that they are ap-
pointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. 10 As a
Justice Department spokesman pointed out in 1961, requiring
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General to
authorize all federal Title III applications gives "greater assur-
" The most comprehensive source of legislative history concerning Title III
is Senate Report No. 1097, supra note 3, which purports to serve as "a comprehensive
and in-depth analysis .. . in order to make explicit congressional intent in this area."
Id. 2177. See also Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); A.B.A. STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 4. However, the Senate Report deals
with Title III's authorization and identification requirements in only a few sentences.
S. REP., supra note 3, at 2185, 2187, 2192. For a more complete discussion of the
legislative history of these provisions, see United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033,
1053-57 (D. Md.), affd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir.
1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). [The district court opinion is cited hereinafter as
Focarile, the court of appeals opinion as Giordano I, and the Supreme Court opinion
as Giordano II. ]
[Section 2516(1)] centralizes in a publicly responsible official subject to the
political process the formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of
electronic surveillance techniques. Centralization will avoid the possibility
that divergent practices might develop. Should abuses occur, the lines of
responsibility lead to an identifiable person. This provision in itself should
go a long way toward guaranteeing that no abuses will happen.
S. REP., supra note 3, at 2185. The Report also states that fixing responsibility is the
statutory purpose of the provisions requiring the Title III application and court
order to state the identity of the authorizing officer. Id. 2189, 2192. See also text ac-
companying notes 181 & 262-64 infra.
10 28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 506 (1970). Title III makes no specific reference to the
Deputy Attorney General, whom the President also appoints with the consent of the
Senate. Id. § 504. However, the courts presently agree that, as Deputy Attorney
General, Acting Attorney General Richard Kleindienst could properly authorize
Title III applications. United States v. Lucido, 373 F. Supp. 1142, 1145, 1147-51
(E.D. Mich. 1974); United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D. Md. 1973).
See United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1972). On the
other hand, the courts presently disagree concerning the authority of a specially
designated Acting Assistant Attorney General lawfully to approve a Title III appli-
cation. Compare United States v. Acon, 377 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1974), and United
States v. Boone, 348 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Va. 1972), with United States v. Vigi, 350
F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (alternative holding). See also United States v. Pellicci,
504 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1974) (acting as Attorney General, the Solicitor General can
properly specially designate an Assistant Attorney General to authorize application).
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ance of a responsible executive determination of the need and
justifiability of each interception."" The statutory require-
ments that each Title III application and court order identify
the authorizing officer serve to assure that a particular individ-
ual makes the responsible executive determination which Con-
gress wished to require; if abuses did occur, Congress wanted
to be certain that the lines of responsibility pointed to a specif-
ic person.
12
The official reports which describe the Justice Depart-
ment's use of the Title III procedure indicate that the govern-
ment has made large-scale use of court-ordered electronic inter-
ceptions.' 3 But while John Mitchell was Attorney General, the
degree of high-level screening which occurred within the
Justice Department was more apparent than real. Lower level
officials did reject authorization requests because the docu-
ments submitted by field attorneys did not satisfy statutory
requirements or were improper as to form. Few applications,
however, were rejected at the very highest level.'
4
" Statement by Assistant Attorney General Herbert J. Miller, Jr., concerning S.
1495, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), quoted in Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1053. This bill
originally proposed that the Attorney General could delegate the decision to authorize
a wiretap application to any official of the Department of Justice or to any United
States Attorney. Miller proposed that delegation be limited in such cases to the nine
Assistant Attorneys General, a limitation which then appeared in every subsequent
proposal examined by the Congress. Id. at 1054-55.
12 S. REP., supra note 3, at 2189, 2192. See United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647,
650-52 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259, 264 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972)
(dictum), vacated (in light of Giordano), 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Narducci,
341 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1055-57. But see
United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575-79 (1974).
13The following chart indicates the number of installations of Title III inter-
ception devices made by federal agents pursuant to court order.
Year Applications Submitted Applications Granted Installations
1968 0 0 0
1969 34 33 30
1970 183 183 180
1971 285 285 281
1972 206 206 205
1973 130 130 130
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS Au-
THORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS
(1968-73). For a detailed analysis of electronic surveillance by the federal and state
governments during the period 1968-June 1971, see H. SCHWARTZ, A REPORT ON THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1971).
14 In March 1973, following remand from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc),
remanding 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972), Judge Mehrtens of the Southern District of
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On the other hand, during the first years that the Justice
Department employed Title III, all external indications sug-
gested that government attorneys were seeking court orders
only after scrupulous compliance with the authorization re-
quirements of the statute. All the government documents in-
volved in a Title III proceeding followed a common form.15
The applying attorney's sworn application typically would assert
that, pursuant to his statutory authority, the Attorney General
had specially designated an Assistant Attorney General, Will
Wilson, to authorize the application and that, pursuant to that
special designation, Wilson had done so. 16 The applying attor-
ney would attach as an exhibit to the application a copy of a
letter addressed to him from the Justice Department and
bearing what purported to be Will Wilson's signature. The
letter would assert that Wilson had personally reviewed the
Florida conducted a full evidentiary hearing on the Title III authorization proce-
dures employed in several cases from that district and from the Northern District
of Georgia. United States v. Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 53-54 (S.D. Fla. 1973). At that
hearing (the Marder hearing), see United States v. Marder, 362 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Fla.
1973), rev'd, 496 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1974), several high-ranking officials or ex-
officials of the Department, including former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, testi-
fied. Mitchell testified that he had refused to authorize Title III applications in some
cases, but did not recall how many. Record at 105-06, United States v. Marder, 362
F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Fla. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Marder Record]. Henry E. Petersen,
a Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division of the Justice Depart-
ment during Mitchell's administration and the person most intimately involved with
the authorization procedure, testified that to the best of his recollection the Attorney
General refused to authorize between two and ten Title III applications during his
tenure in office (January 21, 1969, to March 1, 1972). Id. 156, 202-05.
" See United States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532, 534 (C.D. Cal. 1972). The
Justice Department standardized its Title III procedures over a period of time,
although the procedures employed were substantially the same in each case. Marder
Record, supra note 14, at 43, 161-63. Much of the procedure is described in U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR CONDUCT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNDER TITLE
III OF PUBLIC LAW 90-351 (1970).
6 The pertinent provisions of a typical Title III wiretap application would read
as follows:
Pursuant to the powers conferred on him by Section 2516 of Title 18, United
States Code, the Attorney General of the United States, the Honorable John
N. Mitchell, has specially designated the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice, the Honorable
Will Wilson, to authorize affiant to make this application for an order au-
thorizing the interception of wire communications. The letter of authoriza-
tion signed by the Assistant Attorney General is attached to this appli-
cation as Exhibit A.
United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 650 (3d Cir. 1972). See also United States v.
Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 582-83 n.2 (1974) (opinion of Douglas, J.); United States v.
Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556, 557 (D. Conn. 1972); Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1059.
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facts and circumstances involved in the case and had concluded
that the statutory requirements for a Title III order had been
satisfied. The letter would conclude as follows: "Accordingly,
you are hereby authorized, under the power specially dele-
gated to me in this proceeding by the Attorney General . . .to
make application to a judge of competent jurisdiction for an
order .... ,I7
In addition, some Title III applications would include a
second exhibit, a copy of a memorandum fromr the Attorney
17 A typical letter of authorization reads as follows:
This is in regard to your request for authorization to make application
pursuant to the provisions of § 2518 of Title 18, United States Code, for an
order of the court authorizing the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs to intercept wire communications ....
I have reviewed your request and the facts and circumstances detailed
therein and have determined that probable cause exists to believe that
Nicholas Giordina [sic] and others as yet unknown have committed, are
committing, or are about to commit offenses .... I have further determined
that there exists probable cause to believe the above person makes use of the
described facility in connection with those offenses, that wire communica-
tions concerning the offenses will be intercepted, and that normal investiga-
tive techniques reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried.
Accordingly, you are hereby authorized under the power specially dele-
gated to me in this proceeding by the Attorney General of the United States,
the Honorable John N. Mitchell, pursuant to the power conferred on him by
§ 2516 of Title 18, United States Code, to make application to a judge of
competent jurisdiction for an order of the court pursuant to § 2518 of Title
18, United States Code, authorizing the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs to intercept wire communications from the facility de-
scribed above, for a period of 21 days.
Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1059; see United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 582-83 n.2
(opinion of Douglas, J.); United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 499-500, (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. 1368, 1375-76
(S.D. Fla. 1973); United States v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
The Department of Justice employed this form letter from the time it first began
using the Title III procedure until the spring of 1972, when it changed its internal
forms and the applicable language in Title III applications and proposed court
orders "to reflect the new practice, i.e., to show that it was the Attorney General and
not the Assistant Attorney General who had given the approval." Brief for Petitioner
at 9, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Giordano
Brief].
In its Giordano brief the government asserted that the Justice Department em-
ployed the form letter in compliance with § 1.5 of its Manual for Conduct of Electronic
Surveillance Under Title III of Public Law 90-351. Id. 7 n.5. Section 1.5 of the Manual
reads as follows:
Manner in which authorization will be given. A letter over the signature of the
Attorney General or of the specially designated Assistant Attorney General
will authorize the person named in the request for authorization ... to apply
for the interception order. The applicant should usually be the supervising
attorney, and when it is requested that an agent rather than the attorney
make the application, the reason for that request should be specifically set out.
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General to Assistant Attorney General Wilson. 18 The memo-
randum would describe its subject as "Interception Order Au-
thorization" and would bear the handwritten initials "JNM."
Like the other government documents, these memoranda
followed a common form.' 9 They would refer to a recommen-
dation by the Assistant Attorney General that the application
in question be authorized and then would state: "Pursuant
to the powers conferred on me by Section 2516 of Title 18,
United States Code, you are hereby specially designated to
exercise those powers for the purpose of authorizing . . . the
above-described application.
20
On the basis of these documents and the sworn representa-
tions of the applying attorney, the federal judge would sign
the government's proposed order. In every case that order
would include a finding that, having been specially designated
by the Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General Will
" See, e.g., United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556, 559 n.3 (D. Conn. 1972);
United States v. La Gorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 194-95 (W.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 340
F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
19 The special unit within the Criminal Division of the Justice Department which
initially reviewed all requests for authorization to seek a Title III order also prepared
the form memorandum and the "Will Wilson" letter in each case for the use of senior
officials. Marder Record, supra note 14, at 164, 180.
20 A typical memorandum reads in full as follows:
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MEMORANDUM
TO: Will Wilson DATE: Aug. 19, 1970
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division JNM:DEH:lrt
FROM: John N. Mitchell
Attorney General
SUBJECT: Interception Order Authorization
This is with regard to your recommendation that authorization be given
to Charles T. Erion, Assistant United States Attorney, Middle District of
Georgia, to make application for an interception order under 18 U.S.C. 2518,
permitting the interception of wire communications for a fifteen (15) day
period to and from telephone numbers 912-746-9110, 912-745-2843, 912-746-
2844, and 912-745-2845, listed to the Sportsman's Club, 222 Third Street,
Macon, Georgia, in connection with the investigation into possible violations
of 18 U.S.C. 1084, 1952, and 371, by Billy C. Doolittle and others as yet un-
known.
Pursuant to the powers conferred on me by Section 2516 of Title 18,
United States Code, you are hereby specially designated to exercise those
powers for the purpose of authorizing Charles T. Erion to make the above-
described application.
United States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163, 170 (M.D. Ga. 1972); see United States
v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 582 n.1 (opinion of Douglas, J.); United States v. Bowdach,
366 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 1973); United States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532,
535 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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Wilson had authorized the application in accordance with the
statute.
21
The standardized forms which the government used for its
Title III applications, its attached exhibits, and its proposed
court orders clearly appeared to conform to the statutory re-
quirements regarding authorization. 22  Consequently, few
defense attorneys contested the validity of the authorization
process in the first cases arising under Title 111.23 In the last
months of 1971, however, the Justice Department was forced
to disclose that the authorization procedure actually employed
was quite different from that described in the documents sub-
mitted to the issuing courts, deviating from the statutory re-
quirements in various respects.24 In particular, the govern-
ment disclosed that Will Wilson, the Assistant Attorney General
identified as the authorizing officer in the federal Tide III
applications, had, in fact, done nothing.25 He had reviewed no
21 Title III orders submitted by government attorneys to issuing judges before
the spring of 1972 included a provision that the order was issued
[p]ursuant to application authorized by the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice, the Honorable
Will Wilson, who has been specially designated in. this proceeding by the
Attorney General of the United States, the Honorable John N. Mitchell, to
exercise the power conferred on him by § 2516 of Title 18, United States
Code ....
Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1060; see also United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574
n.5 (1974); United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 650 (3d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp. 1112, 1114-15 (N.D. Ga. 1973).2 2 See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 499-502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp. 1112, 1113-16 (N.D. Ga.
1973) (government's documents created the "unmistakable impression" that Mitchell
specially designated Wilson, who authorized the application).
23 In the earliest cases arising under Title III, defense attorneys usually chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the statute and contested the sufficiency of the factual
showing on the basis of which the court had issued the interception order. See, e.g.,
United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914 (D. Del. 1971); United States v. Sklaroff,
323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971); United States v. Escander, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.
Fla. 1970). In a different prosecution of Sklaroff, counsel challenged certain claimed
deficiencies in the documentation of the authorization process. See United States
v. Sklaroff, 360 F. Supp. 353, 356 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See also United States v. Cantor,
328 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affd, 470 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1972).
24 The government was ultimately forced to disclose the true nature of its au-
thorization procedures because on the first day of a criminal trial involving Title III
evidence a defense attorney, James J. Hogan, Esq., of Miami Beach, Florida, discovered
that the "Will Wilson" signatures on different letters of authorization varied remark-
ably. United States v. Sklaroff, 360 F. Supp. 353, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See also TIME,
Mar. 27, 1972, at 34.
25 United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 567 (1974); see, e.g., United States v.
Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1298 n.5 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974) ("Will
Wilson did not examine either file or expressly authorize either application."); United
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files and had signed no letters. He had simply instructed two
deputies to prepare letters of authorization and to sign his
name as a routine matter in those cases in which the Attorney
General's office forwarded a Title III application and an ini-
tialed memorandum.
26
These disclosures prompted a flood of suppression motions
by indicted defendants who contended that, because the Justice
Department had improperly authorized the Title III applica-
tions and had misrepresented the identity of the authorizing
officer, the subsequent interceptions were unlawful. 27 But the
wholesale suppression of Title III interceptions did not follow,
because many lower courts accepted a series of government
arguments which transformed the straightforward require-
States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556, 558 (D. Conn. 1972) (Wilson did not authorize
Title III applications or sign letters of authorization); United States v. Narducci, 341
F. Supp. 1107, 1109, 1112-13 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Baldassari, 338 F.
Supp. 904, 906-07 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
At the Marder evidentiary hearing, see note 14 supra, government witnesses
testified that Wilson occasionally did participate in authorization deliberations and,
in fact, had signed a few letters of authorization in 1969. See note 169 infra. However,
in its brief to the Supreme Court, the government described its standard procedure
as one in which a Deputy Assistant Attorney General, not Assistant Attorney General
Wilson, decided whether to recommend approval on behalf of the Criminal Division.
Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 5.
6 See United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1298 n.5 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 918 (1974) (affidavit of Henry E. Petersen); United States v. Narducci, 341
F. Supp. 1107, 1112-13 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (affidavits of Henry E. Petersen and Will
Wilson); see also Appendix at 85-86, 89-90, United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562
(1974) (affidavits of Harold P. Shapiro and Henry E. Petersen). In fact, however,
the authorization to sign Wilson's name was even broader than that suggested.
Wilson, Petersen, and Shapiro all testified at the Marder hearing that Wilson had
orally authorized his Deputies to sign his name to any document which involved
routine administrative matters not requiring a deviation from policy. Marder Record,
supra note 14, at 137, 148-50, 258, 263, 277. Furthermore, Petersen and Shapiro would
decide in such cases whether Wilson's personal consideration was necessary. Id. 263.
27 Because of the timing of the government's disclosures, some defendants tech-
nically had waived the right to raise the issue by previously standing trial or by entering
a plea of guilty. Nevertheless, the courts did not refuse to consider the issue on the
merits in such cases. See, e.g., United States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259, 260-61 (2d Cir.
1972), vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189, 190-91
(5th Cir. 1972), remanded, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc). But see United States
v. Wright, 466 F.2d 1256, 1259 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973). Further-
more, in cases in which the Title III evidence would clearly result in convictions if
admissible, some courts permitted defendants to enter pleas of guilty subject to
appellate review of the orders denying the motions to suppress. See, e.g., United States
v. Roberts, 477 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974). The courts
of appeals have differed concerning the propriety of this highly practical proce-
dure. Compare Mann v. Smith, 488 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
932 (1974); United States v. Mizell, 488 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1973); and United States
v. Sepe, 468 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1973), with United States v. Rothberg, 480 F.2d 534
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
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ments of the authorization statute into what one court called
an " 'Alice-in-Wonderland' world. 28
Eventually, the issues raised by the government's disclo-
sures reached the United States Supreme Court. On May 13,
1974, the Court announced its decision in United States v. Gior-
dano29 and United States v. Chavez,30 both government appeals
from lower court orders suppressing wiretap evidence obtained
in violation of the authorization and identification requirements
of Title III. The Court unanimously agreed that the Justice
Department's procedures did not comply with the statutory
requirements. 31 Nevertheless, the Justices disagreed about the
magnitude of the various violations and whether the statutory
remedy of suppression should apply in every case.32 As a re-
sult of the Giordano decision, the Justice Department's failure
to follow the statutory procedure has jeopardized sixty cases
28 Giordano I, 469 F.2d at 524.
29 416 U.S. 505 (1974), aff'g 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972).
30 416 U.S. 562 (1974), rev'g in part 478 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1973). [The court
of appeals opinion is cited hereinafter as Chavez I, and the Supreme Court opinion
as Chavez I.]
3 Giordano II, 416 U.S. at 508 (authorizations of Tide III applications by officials
other than those specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970)); Chavez II, 416 U.S. at 570
(misidentification of authorizing officer contrary to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(a), (4)(d)
(1970)).
32 justice White prepared the opinions of the Court in both Giordano and Chavez.
All the other Justices concurred in his conclusion that the Justice Department's devia-
tions from Title III's authorization and identification requirements were contrary to
the statute, see note 31 supra. The Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist,
however, joined in an opinion by Justice Powell, dissenting from the Court's holding
that violations of the authorization requirement required suppression not only of
the conversations intercepted pursuant to the misauthorized application, but also
pursuant to subsequent orders extending the original interception order or extending
an order permitting the use of a pen register device in connection with the same
investigation. (A pen register is a device which records the digits of all telephone
numbers called from a given telephone, see Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1038 n.1, 1039-40.
See also note 37 infra. Justice Powell contended that because the applications for
extension 6rders were not themselves defective in any respect and were fully sup-
ported by showings of probable cause independent of any of th6 evidence obtained
by means of the original tainted Title III order, their fruits should not be suppressed.
416 U.S. at 552-53 (opinion of Powell, J.). He therefore dissented from that portion
of Justice White's opinion which affirmed the suppression of that derivative evi-
dence because the issuing court had granted the extension orders in reliance upon
the evidence obtained by the tainted interceptions. See id. at 548-49; accord, Focarile,
340 F. Supp. at 1041, 1050.
In Chavez, by contrast, the four Giordano dissenters joined in Justice White's
conclusion that although misidentifications of the authorizing officer in Title III
orders violated the statute, suppression was not required. 416 U.S. at 579-80. Justice
Douglas dissented to this aspect of Chavez (as well as to Giordano's construction of the
suppression provision) in an opinion in which Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall
joined. Id. at 580-81 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
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against over 626 defendants. 3 In Chavez, however, by a five-to-
four vote, the Supreme Court saved the government's evidence
in another ninety-nine cases against 807 additional defen-
dants. 4 The majority reversed the Chavez suppression order
and remanded for further proceedings not because the govern-
ment's procedures were proper, but because the Court con-
cluded that suppression was unwarranted in the circumstances.
The key to the majority's decision in Chavez is its conclu-
sion that Congress did not intend the statutory remedy of
suppression to apply to all deviations from the statute's re-
quirements. Part II of this Article contends that conclusion
was wrong. Both the Chavez majority and the dissenters over-
looked several crucial aspects of the government's case which
deserve critical examination and which, if properly resolved,
might well require the remedy of suppression even under the
"substantial violation" rationale which the Chavez majority
adopted. Part III of the Article considers whether the mis-
representations concerning authorization made under oath,
but in good faith, by the applying attorney to the issuing judges
constituted deliberate misrepresentations by the Justice De-
partment as an institution, and the consequences of such a con-
clusion. Part IV examines two issues relating to the govern-
ment's use of conclusory affidavits to "correct" the record
concerning the authorization process, which lower federal
courts had resolved in conflicting fashion, but which the Su-
preme Court chose to ignore. In order to appreciate the legal
and factual context in which these various issues arose, it is
first necessary to examine more closely the Justice Department's
procedures and the specifics of the Court's decisions in
Giordano and Chavez.
I. GIORDANO AND CHAVEZ: THE AUTHORIZATION
PROCEDURES
There are over fifty reported federal court decisions and
a number of unreported decisions concerning the Justice De-
partment's authorization process. Although the circumstances
of these cases necessarily vary, the facts of Giordano and Chavez
are typical in most important respects.
3 5
3 416 U.S. at 599.
3
4
Id.
35 The misidentification issue decided in Chavez existed in virtually every Title
III case in which the government employed its standard Title III forms prior to the
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A. United States v. Giordano
Giordano involved three related prosecutions of fourteen
defendants for trafficking in narcotics. 36 The government's case
against each defendant depended upon wiretap and pen regis-
ter evidence obtained from the telephone of one of the de-
fendants pursuant to court orders.37 The defendants moved
to suppress that evidence on the grounds commonly raised in
such cases, but, presumably because the Title III applications,
orders and related documents appeared to be proper on their
face, the defendants did not initially challenge the validity of
the authorization process.3 8 After the district court had com-
plete hearings on the motions to suppress, the Fifth Circuit's
decision in the first of the authorization cases, United States v.
spring of 1972. See Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 4-9. Giordano represented the most
common class of cases in which the Justice Department's procedures deviated from
the authorization requirements of § 2516(1). In Giordano neither Assistant Attorney
General Will Wilson nor the Attorney General himself authorized submission of the
Title III applications to the issuing court; the Attorney General's executive assistant,
Sol Lindenbaum, purported to authorize the application. See text accompanying notes
41-44 infra. Other factual variations on the authorization issue involve situations in
which Lindenbaum initialed the appropriate document pursuant to the Attorney
General's telephoned instructions, see United States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259, 263
(2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp.
532, 535 (C.D. Cal. 1972), one case in which the government argued that Lindenbaum
had acted in place of the Attorney General for the purpose of specially designating
Will Wilson to act, United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1972),
remanded, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), and two cases in which the courts
decided that both the Attorney General and an Assistant Attorney General had
authorized the applications in question, United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647 (3d
Cir. 1972), rev'g United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357 (M.D. Pa. 1971); United
States v. Vigi, 350 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1972). It appears that Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Richard Kleindienst purported to authorize applications not only
after he assumed the position of Acting Attorney General, see note 10 supra, but also
before, Marder Record, supra note 14, at 59, 72.
16Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1036.
17 The issuing judge signed a Title III order dated October 16, 1970, permitting
agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to tap Giordano's tele-
phone and intercept his wire communications for a period of 21 days; and a 15-day
extension order was signed on November 6, 1970. The issuing judge also authorized
B.N.D.D. agents to attach pen register devices to Giordano's telephones by an order
dated October 8, 1970, and two extension orders dated October 22 and November 6,
1970. 416 U.S. at 529-30, 548-50. The court of appeals confused the dates of the
pen register extension orders and the dates of the Title III orders. Compare 469 F.2d
at 525 with 340 F. Supp. at 1036.
38 Before the defendants became aware of the authorization issue, they had
moved to suppress the wiretap and pen register evidence on the following grounds:
that the recording of a pen register constitutes an interception within the meaning
of Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970); that the pen register orders did not comply
with Title III's requirements; that the government's applications for wiretap and pen
register orders failed to establish probable cause; that the government's applications
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Robinson,39 alerted the parties that something might be amiss.4 °
The district court conducted further proceedings in which the
government submitted the affidavits of two Justice Depart-
ment officials describing the authorization procedure em-
ployed.
The affidavit of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Henry
Shapiro detailed the procedures followed in reviewing the
applications and related documents before submission to the
office of the Attorney General. Shapiro's affidavit indicated
that, after the office of the Attorney General had "approved"
the authorization request, he had caused the "Will Wilson"
letters to be sent to the applying attorney.4' The affidavit did
not indicate what role, if any, Will Wilson played in connection
for Title III wiretap orders failed to make the necessary showing that other investiga-
tive techniques would not succeed or would be too dangerous; that the B.N.D.D.
agents failed to conduct the electronic interceptions of wire communications so as to
minimize the interception of innocent communications; and that the issuing court
permitted the agents to conduct their electronic surveillance for an unreasonably long
period. See generally 340 F. Supp. at 1037-51.
39 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972), remanded, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
40 340 F. Supp. at 1051.
41 Shapiro's affidavit read in full as follows:
Harold P. Shapiro, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
At the times of the events related in this affidavit, I was a Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division of the United States
Department of Justice.
This affidavit describes the processing within the Criminal Division of
the Department of Justice of two requests for authorization to make appli-
cation to a Federal Court for wire interception orders. Both requests related
to a certain telephone in Baltimore, Maryland, allegedly used by Nicholas
Giordina or Nicholas Giordano and others.
The formal requests for authorization to apply for wire interception
orders were made by the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs on October 15 and November 5, 1970, respectively. Prior to action
on each request, the respective Departmental working file, which included
copies of the proposed affidavit, application, and order, was reviewed in a
special unit of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the
Criminal Division by an attorney whose primary function was to review the
entire matter for form and substance with particular emphasis on assuring
strict adherence to the required statutory, judicial and Constitutional stan-
dards. The attorney of that unit handling the requests, Philip T. White,
reviewed the files and recommended favorable action on the requests. The
files were then submitted for review to Kurt W. Muellenberg, Deputy Chief,
and to William S. Lynch, Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section,
respectively, who recommended approval and sent them to me. I examined
the files and forwarded them to the Office of the Attorney General with de-
tailed recommendations that the authorizations be granted. As part of my
examination of the files, I reviewed the letters of October 16 and November
6, 1970, to Francis S. Brocato advising him that he was authorized to present
the applications to the court, initialed the file copies, and authorized their
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with the authorization requests, but the government subse-
quently conceded that Wilson had done nothing.42
The affidavit of the Attorney General's Executive Assistant,
Sol Lindenbaum, described the manner in which the Attorney
General's office approved the applying attorney's request for
authorization. 43 Lindenbaum stated that the Attorney General
dispatch upon approval of the request for application in the Office of the
Attorney General.
Appendix at 100-01, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
42 340 F. Supp. at 1052.
43 Lindenbaum's affidavit read in full as follows:
Sol Lindenbaum being duly sworn deposes and says:
At the times of the acts related in this affidavit I was and I am now the
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States. I assist
the Attorney General in the review of various matters which require his
personal attention such as opinions, interpretations, decisions of the Board
of Immigration Appeals, applications for pardon and other forms of Execu-
tive clemency, antitrust complaints, contracts, agreements, and proposed
offers in compromise. See Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 0.6.
The Attorney General has refrained from designating any Assistant
Attorney General to authorize, without his approval, the making of an ap-
plication for an order permitting the interception of wire or oral communi-
cations under Title 18, United States Code, Section 2516(1). Rather, the
Attorney General has required that all requests for such authorization be
referred to him for consideration. In the normal course of my duties, I review
such requests and make recommendations to the Attorney General thereon. I
have routinely reviewed such requests since February 1969 and, accordingly,
have become familiar with the applicable statutory requirements and the
actions taken by the Attorney General on such requests.
On October 16, 1970, the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice addressed to the Attorney General a request for approval of an
authorization to apply for an interception order initiated by the Director
of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and related to a certain
telephone in Baltimore, Maryland, allegedly used by Nicholas Giordina
[sic] and others. The request was accompanied by copies of the proposed
affidavit, application, and order, as well as a recommendation for approval
from the Criminal Division. I reviewed the submitted material and con-
cluded that the request in this case satisfied the requirements of the statute.
I also concluded, from my knowledge of the Attorney General's actions on
previous cases, that he would approve the request if submitted to him. Be-
cause the Attorney General was on a trip away from Washington, D.C. I
approved the request pursuant to the authorization which he had given to
me to act in the circumstances and caused his initials to be placed on a memo-
randum to Will Wilson. The memorandum, a copy of which is attached,
approved a request that authorization be given to Francis S. Brocato to make
application for an interception order.
On November 6, 1970 the Attorney General approved a request that
authorization be given to Francis S. Brocato to make application for an order
continuing the interception on the telephone in Baltimore, Maryland,
allegedly used by Nicholas Giordano and others. Attached is a copy of the
Attorney General's personally initialed memorandum of that date to Will
Wilson reflecting his favorable action on the request.
Appendix at 96-97, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
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was on a trip away from Washington when the application for
the initial order arrived. Under these circumstances, Linden-
baum himself reviewed the application and decided from his
"knowledge of the Attorney General's actions on previous
cases, that he would approve the request if submitted to him. 44
Therefore, pursuant to the Attorney General's instructions for
such cases, Lindenbaum placed the Attorney General's initials
on the form memorandum addressed to Will Wilson and re-
turned it to Wilson's office, where it came to Shapiro's atten-
tion.
In the light of these affidavits the district court suppressed
the wiretap evidence, because the government's misrepre-
sentations concerning the identity of the authorizing officer
had resulted in a misidentification of that officer in the Title
III order in violation of the provisions of the statute.45 The
court of appeals questioned the district court's rationale, 46 but
44 Id. 97. The affidavits of John N. Mitchell and Sol Lindenbaum which the govern-
ment filed in various authorization cases do not detail the criteria on the basis of
which Lindenbaum determined that the Attorney General would or would not ap-
prove a given application. They simply assert that because Lindenbaum reviewed
all requests for authorization before the Attorney General acted upon them and
because he was familiar with the statutory requirements and with the Attorney
General's policies and decisions in Title III cases, the Attorney General orally au-
thorized Lindenbaum to approve applications when the Attorney General was un-
available. See, e.g., United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 500-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 650-51 n.7 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1111-12 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
At the Marder evidentiary hearing both former Attorney General John N. Mitchell
and Sol Lindenbaum testified concerning the circumstances under which Mitchell
had authorized Lindenbaum to act. There were significant inconsistencies in the
testimony of the two witnesses. Mitchell repeatedly asserted that Lindenbaum was
only authorized to act in those cases in which Mitchell was outside of the United
States; in all other cases Lindenbaum was instructed to consult with Mitchell by
telephone before taking any action. Marder Record, supra note 14, at 46-47, 54-55,
57-58, 64-66, 74-75, 78-80. Lindenbaum asserted that his authority to act indepen-
dently was not limited to situations in which Mitchell was abroad, but existed in any
situation in which the Attorney General was "unavailable." Id. 215-16, 235, 237-38.
See also Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 12-16. Mitchell and Lindenbaum did agree,
however, that on November 20, 1971, the Attorney General withdrew his authoriza-
tion to Lindenbaum to approve applications on the Attorney General's behalf.
4340 F. Supp. at 1059.
4The court of appeals rejected a proposition which the district court had as-
sumed to be true for the purpose of its decision: that authorization by Lindenbaum
satisfied the statute. 469 F.2d at 529-30; 340 F. Supp. at 1059. The court of ap-
peals questioned the grounds of the district court's decision, commenting, "Perhaps it
can plausibly be argued that when an application is properly authorized and only
the identity of the source is mistakenly transmitted to the judge, he would have
authorized the wiretap had he known the real facts." 469 F.2d at 530. In a later deci-
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affirmed the suppression order because neither the Attorney
General nor any specially designated Assistant Attorney General
had personally authorized the application as Title III re-
quired.47 The government then sought Supreme Court review,
relying on three basic arguments which it had previously em-
ployed in the lower courts in most Title III cases involving Sol
Lindenbaum.
First, the government made no claim that, by signing Will
Wilson's name to a letter of authorization and by sending that
letter to an applying attorney, Wilson's deputies could effec-
tively authorize a Title III application within the meaning of
the statute. 48 Rather, the government characterized those
functions as simply ministerial acts.49 The government claimed
that despite the representations in the various Title III docu-
ments submitted to issuing judges to the contrary, the Attorney
General had never "specially designated" Will Wilson to per-
form the discretionary act of authorization which Title III
required.50 He had always reserved that power to himself.
According to the government, the discretionary act of authori-
sion a different panel of the same court of appeals refused to suppress Title III
evidence under circumstances similar to those assumed to exist in Focarile. United
States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 984-85 (4th Cir. 1973); accord, United States v. Askins,
351 F. Supp. 408, 412-13 (D. Md. 1972) (limiting Focarile). However, the Bobo deci-
sion may be distinguishable because the court of appeals concluded that "[t]he fact that
Mitchell himself had approved the request was made known to the judge to whom
the application was made." 477 F.2d at 985. See United States v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp.
1112, 1118 n.13 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
4, 469 F.2d at 530.
48 See Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 6-8.
'9 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505
(1974); Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 71 n.55; cf. affidavit of Harold Shapiro, supra
note 41. The lower courts generally adopted the government's characterization of
these actions by Wilson's two deputies, e.g., United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 649,
651 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir.
1972), vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974). But see United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp.
1107, 1113 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
50 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9-10, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S.
505 (1974). Many of the affidavits of John N. Mitchell which the government filed in
different authorization cases, see Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 10 n.8, made the
same assertion. For example, the Mitchell affidavit filed in United States v. King, 478
F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973), read in part as follows:
Although 18 U.S.C. 2516(1) permitted me, as Attorney General, to desig-
nate an Assistant Attorney General to authorize applications for wire intercep-
tions without my approval, I chose not to make such designation, but rather to
require that all requests for authority to file such applications be forwarded
to me for consideration. This procedure was intended to centralize in me
the responsibility for and control of the policies to be followed by the De-
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zation occurred when the Attorney General initialed the form
memorandum addressed to Will Wilson. 51
Second, the government contended that when the Attor-
ney General's Executive Assistant placed the Attorney General's
initials on that form memorandum on the Attorney General's
behalf and pursuant to his general instructions, the Executive
Assistant's action constituted adequate compliance with Title
III's authorization requirements to satisfy the statute.52 The
government asserted that the applicable provision of Title III,
section 2516(1), 53 permitted delegation of the authorization
function so long as the Attorney General remained ultimately
responsible for the act of approval.54 The government relied
partment of Justice in relation to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
All requests received in my office are reviewed by my Executive Assistant,
Sol Lindenbaum. Except as otherwise indicated herein, Mr. Lindenbaum
transmits the request and all accompanying papers to me, along with his
recommendation. If I determine to approve a request, I indicate my approval
by initialling a memorandum addressed to the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Criminal Division. This memorandum recites that the Assis-
tant Attorney General is "specially designated" to authorize the application.
Upon receipt of my memorandum, a letter of authorization, over the name
of the Assistant Attorney General is dispatched to the Applicant. The mem-
orandum and the letter of authorization are part of the procedure devel-
oped for transmittal of my approval to the applicant. The memorandum
constitutes a notification to the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division that I have performed the discretionary act of approving the request.
Id. at 500.
" Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 5-7; see affidavit of John N. Mitchell, supra
note 50. The government's claim that the Attorney General personally authorized
Title III applications when his initials were placed on the form memorandum
addressed to Will Wilson is inconsistent with the text of that memorandum and with
the other Title III documents, especially the Will Wilson letter. See notes 216-17 infra
& accompanying text. However, the government sidestepped the question of incon-
sistency by justifying the Will Wilson letter as a necessary compliance with the Justice
Department's own wiretap manual. Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 5.
52 Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 52-65. One district court described the posi-
tion of Executive Assistant as follows:
The Executive Assistant to the Attorney General is not an office created by
statute as is the Deputy Attorney General or the nine Assistant Attorneys
General who are appointed by the President by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, to assist the Attorney General in the performance of his
duties, 28 U.S.C. §§ 504, 506. Rather it is a post established in the Dept. of
Justice by administrative regulation to assist the Attorney General in various
matters submitted for the Attorney General's action and perform such
other duties and functions as may be specially assigned from time to time by
the Attorney General. 28 C.F.R. 0.6.
United States v. Cihal, 336 F. Supp. 261, 263 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
53 See note 6 supra.
" Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9-11, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S.
505 (1974); Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 54-55, 61-62, 64-65.
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upon the language of various statutes which either permitted
the delegation of responsibilities vested in the Attorney Gen-
eral55 or which prohibited such delegation in terms not em-
ployed in the Title III provision.56 In particular, the govern-
ment contended that Congress only intended the Attorney
General to establish the appropriate policies for the use of Title
III and to make certain those policies were properly applied in
individual cases, but not necessarily to make each authoriza-
tion decision personally. 57
These arguments had achieved little success in the lower
courts.58 Consequently, before the Supreme Court, the govern-
ment placed the greatest emphasis upon its final argument:
55Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 60-61. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1970)
provides:
The Attorney General may from time to time make such provisions as he
considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer,
employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the
Attorney General.
Congress adopted § 510 at the same time that it adopted another provision, id. § 509,
which vested most of the responsibilities of the Department of Justice in the Attorney
General personally.
N Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 57 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 245(a)(1) (1970)).
57 Giordano Brief, sura note 17, at 52-57.
-I The lower courts generally rejected the government's arguments concerning
authorization by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant, and suppressed elec-
tronic interceptions obtained pursuant to court orders whose applications had been
approved by neither the Attorney General nor a specially designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, e.g., United States v. Mantello, 478 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974); United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Roberts, 477 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 908 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972), re-
manded, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973 (en banc). Contra, United States v. Pisacano, 459
F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
The lower courts rejected the government's argument that 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1970)
permitted the Attorney General to delegate his authorization functions under Title
III to his Executive Assistant on a variety of grounds. The proposed construction, for
example, would make the explicit "special designation" of the more recently enacted
Title III provision mere surplusage. United States v. Robinson, supra at 191-92.
Furthermore, Title III's specific terms and precise enumeration of who could per-
form the authorization function required the exclusion by implication of all other,
unmentioned officials. United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp. 1080, 1082-83 (E.D.
Mich. 1972).
The government also argued in the lower courts that when Executive Assistant
Sol Lindenbaum approved Title III applications on the Attorney General's behalf,
he had simply acted as the Attorney General's "alter ego," whose act should be
attributed to the Attorney General himself. Giordano 1, 469 F.2d at 526. See also United
States v. King, supra at 503-04; United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1114
(E.D. Pa. 1972). With one major exception, the courts of appeals which considered
the issue also rejected the "alter ego" argument. They generally concluded that
Congress intended an official identified in § 2516(1) to give "personal attention" to the
authorization of Title III applications. Giordano 1, 469 F.2d at 529; United States v.
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that even if its authorization procedures had not strictly com-
plied with Title III's requirements, the Court should not impose
the drastic remedy of suppression.59 The government charac-
terized the authorization process as a matter of internal proce-
dure unrelated to the privacy interests of persons subjected to
electronic surveillance, 60 and argued that the specific language
of Title III's statutory suppression sanction did not apply to
Narducci, supra at 114-15. See United States v. Robinson, supra at 192. The lower
courts also rejected the "alter ego" argument because, in principle at least, it would
permit not only the Executive Assistant, but any other person in whom the Attorney
General placed his confidence to perform functions which Congress assigned to the
Attorney General himself. To condone such a practice might encourage further
laxity. United States v. Narducci, supra at 1115. Furthermore, as the court of appeals
noted in Giordano, such a practice would also permit the Attorney General to evade
his responsibilities at will simply by repudiating the actions of a purported alter ego
when those actions proved to be improper or politically embarrassing. 469 F.2d at
528-29.
Despite these deficiencies, the government did persuade one panel of the Second
Circuit that the Justice Department's procedures satisfied § 2516(1) even when the
Attorney General did not personally participate in the authorization process. United
States v. Pisacano, supra. The Pisacano court felt Title III was satisfied because the
Attorney General had assumed full responsibility for what had been done. Id. at 263.
Indeed, the court even concluded that the action by the Executive Assistant satisfied
the letter of § 2516(1). If Congress had wanted to preclude the Attorney General
from delegating the function of authorization to his Executive Assistant, stated the
court, it could have included an express prohibition in the authorization provision.
Id. at 263-64.
As the Supreme Court noted in its Giordano opinion, no lower court has adopted
Pisacano's rationale, although other panels of that court of appeals and subordinate
district courts have followed the ruling as a matter of precedent. 416 U.S. at 511-12
n.3. Furthermore, those other Second Circuit panels and subordinate district courts
have criticized the Justice Department's procedures even while condoning them, at
least in a functional sense. United States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 917 (1974); United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230, 236 (2d Cir.
1972), vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974); see United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556,
559 (D. Conn. 1972).
-9 Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 29-5 1. The court of appeals in Giordano re-
jected this argument as "a beautiful example of the bootstrap technique." 469 F.2d
at 531. See also United States v. Wierzbicki, 12 CRIt. L. REP. 2075 (E.D. Mich. 1972);
United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1116-17 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States
v. Cihal, 336 F. Supp. 261, 267 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
6Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 33-36. The government asserted that Con-
gress enacted Title III's statutory suppression sanction, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970),
in order to codify existing search and seizure law, not to create additional grounds
for whose violation courts should suppress otherwise admissible evidence. The
government argued that the action of the issuing judge in reviewing the sworn ap-
plication for an interception order and in making the necessary findings of necessity
and probable cause completely satisfied the fourth amendment's requirements.
Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 30-33, 43-44. According to the government, Title
III's authorization requirements were not intended to protect the rights of any in-
dividual, but to assure Congress and the public as a whole that the Justice Depart-
ment was centralizing its policies regarding electronic interceptions as the Congress
intended. Id. 53, 55-57, 71.
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violations of the authorization requirements. 61
The Supreme Court found the government's arguments
concerning Lindenbaum's actions unpersuasive. 62 Noting that
Congress had imposed "important preconditions" to securing
a Title III court order in order to be certain that the statutory
authority to conduct electronic surveillances would be used with
restraint, the Court described the authorization requirement
of section 2516(1) as a "critical precondition" intended to assure
the "mature judgment of a particular, responsible Department
of Justice official. ' 63  The Court unanimously rejected the
government's delegation arguments because the language of
section 2516(1) explicitly identified Assistant Attorneys General
as the only Justice Department officials to whom the Attorney
General could assign the authorization function.
64
Nevertheless, from the government's point of view, Gior-
dano was not a total failure; despite section 2515 of Title III,
which prohibits the reception into evidence of any improperly
intercepted communication, 65 five members of the Court
adopted the government's view that Title III's suppression did
not apply to all deviations from the statute's requirements.
66
61 Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 34-39. See text accompanying notes 72-78
infra.
62 416 U.S. at 512-13; id. at 548 (opinion of Powell, J.).
63 Id. at 515-16.
64 d. at 514, 523; id. at 548 (opinion of Powell, J.). The Court also rejected the
government's argument that the Attorney General's delegation powers under § 2516(1)
should not be narrowly confined to his Assistant Attorneys General in the light of
§ 2516(2), which permits state legislation to authorize the principal prosecuting
officers of political subdivisions of a state to seek interception orders, see Giordano
Brief, supra note 17, at 55-57. The Court concluded that Congress obviously intended
to centralize the power of seeking interception orders as much as possible, and implied
that § 2516(2) had been drafted in a more permissive form to allow for individual
variations in the prosecutorial structure of different states. 416 U.S. at 522-23; see S.
REP., supra note 3, at 2187.
65 This section reads in full as follows:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part
of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a
political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be
in violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970). Another Title III provision, § 2517, affirmatively permits
the disclosure of intercepted communications only if obtained "by any means au-
thorized by this chapter."
66 416 U.S. at 524-29. Most lower courts reached the conclusion that § 2515 pro-
hibits the use of any communication intercepted pursuant to a Tide III court order
when the application fails to conform to the statute's requirements; they recognized
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In attempting to avoid the section 2515 prohibition, the
government emphasized section 2518(10)(a), which- provides
that any person with standing may move to suppress an inter-
cepted communication or evidence derived therefrom on the
following grounds:
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with
the order of authorization or approval.
6 7
In Giordano, the district court suppressed the wiretap evi-
dence under paragraph (ii) of section 2518(10)(a). The court
reasoned that an order of authorization which failed to identify
the authorizing officer altogether would be insufficient on its
face, and that an order which misidentified the authorizing
officer was similarly defective. 68 The court of appeals agreed
that suppression was proper pursuant to paragraph (ii), but for
a different reason: that the nonauthorization of the applica-
that Congress intended to assure strict compliance, see text accompanying note 5
supra, and suppression appeared to be the obvious remedy to achieve that result.
See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp. 1112, 1117 (N.D. Ga. 1973); United
States v. Cihal, 336 F. Supp. 261, 267 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
67 Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 35-39. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970) reads
in full as follows:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any
court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to
suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or
evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was inter-
cepted is insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of au-
thorization or approval.
Such motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or proceeding unless
there was no opportunity to make such motion or the person was not aware of
the grounds of the motion. If the motion is granted, the contents of the
intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom,
shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this chapter. The
judge, upon the filing of such motion by the aggrieved person, may in his
discretion make available to the aggrieved person or his counsel for in-
spection such portions of the intercepted communication or evidence de-
rived therefrom as the judge determines to be in the interests of justice.
Section 2510(11) defines an "aggrieved person" as "a person who was a party to any
intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception
was directed."
68 340 F. Supp. at 1060.
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tion by any proper officer made the resulting court order the
equivalent of an order insufficient on its face.
69
The Supreme Court decided that neither the improper
authorization of the application nor the misidentification of the
authorizing officer in the court order made that order facially
insufficient. Justice White's majority opinion noted that the
interception order did identify, albeit erroneously, a specially
designated Assistant Attorney General as the person who had
authorized the application; on its face, therefore, the court
order was sufficient despite the government's subsequent dis-
closures.
70
But the court of appeals had also concluded that the wire-
tap evidence was intercepted unlawfully under paragraph (i)
because of "the pattern of the Government's behavior in ignor-
ing statutory requirement after statutory requirement. ' 71 The
government sought to overcome this conclusion by construing
paragraph (i) to apply only to interceptions which would violate
the Constitution.7 2 Asserting that paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of
section 2518(10)(a) mandate suppression for "purely statutory
defaults without constitutional overtones," the government
contended that if the phrase "unlawfully intercepted" in para-
graph (i) encompassed purely statutory deviations, paragraphs
(ii) and (iii) would be devoid of meaning.7 3 The government
sought additional support for its position by quoting the legis-
lative history of section 2518(10)(a), which suggested that the
section was intended only to codify existing search and seizure
law without significant expansion of the suppression remedy.7 4
Justice White's opinion allowed that the government's
argument had merit as a matter of statutory construction. The
majority agreed that paragraphs (ii) and (iii) "must be deemed"
to provide suppression under circumstances to which para-
69 469 F.2d at 531. See note 46 supra.
7' 416 U.S. at 525 n.14.
71 469 F.2d at 531.
72 Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 35-36. The government had also employed
this argument in some lower court cases. Although one court of appeals did adopt it,
In re Marcus, 491 F.2d 901, 903 (lst Cir.), vacated, 417 U.S. 942 (1974), other lower
courts were unpersuaded, see United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1116 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
73 416 U.S. at 526.
74 Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 38-39; see S. REP., supra note 3, at 2184-85,
2195.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:750
graph (i) would not apply. 75 However, the majority rejected
the contention that paragraph (i) applied only to constitu-
tional violations, holding instead that paragraph (i) would
require suppression for violations of any of the statutory re-
quirements which "directly and substantially implement the
congressional intention to limit the use of intercept proce-
dures to those situations clearly calling for the employment
of this extraordinary investigative device. ' 76 The majority iden-
tified section 2516(1), which conditions the use of intercept
procedures "upon the judgment of a senior official in the De-
partment of Justice," as a critical statutory provision. 77 Relying
upon the legislative history of Title III, the majority stated,
"We are confident that the provision for pre-application ap-
proval was intended to play a central role in the statutory
scheme and that suppression must follow when it is shown that
this statutory requirement has been ignored.17
Four members of the Court disagreed with Justice White's
interpretation of paragraph (i) of section 2518(10)(a), because
in their view, Title III did not reflect a congressional intent to
treat some statutory violations more seriously than others. 79
They accused the majority of overstepping the judicial func-
tion by arrogating to the courts discretion "to pick and choose
among various statutory provisions, suppressing evidence only
when they determine that a provision is . . . 'directly and sub-
stantially' related to the congressional scheme. '8 0 In partic-
ular, they objected to the majority's use of that discretion in
Chavez.
B. United States v. Chavez
Like Giordano, Chavez was a narcotics case. 81 The govern-
ment had obtained critical evidence against twelve defendants
as the result of two court-ordered wiretaps. The applications
75 416 U.S. at 537.
76 Id.
77 Id.
71 Id. at 528.
71 Chavez 11, 416 U.S. at 585-87 (opinion of Douglas, J., joined by Brennan,
Marshall, and Stewart, JJ.).
80 Id. at 584-85. In fact, some lower courts had assumed such a discretion in Title
III cases involving only the misidentification of the authorizing officer, see text ac-
companying notes 91-98 infra, or involving the government's failure to give notice of
Title III proceedings within the statutory period, see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1970); cases
cited in note 9 supra.
" Chavez I.
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for each wiretap order, the orders themselves, and the related
documents included the usual statements that the Attorney
General had specially designated Will Wilson under section
2516(1) and that, after personally reviewing the appropriate
documents, Wilson had authorized the submission of the ap-
plications to the issuing judge.
8 2
After the government notified the defendants that it in-
tended to offer wiretap evidence at trial,8 3 the defendants
moved to suppress, and the government filed the affidavits of
various Justice Department officials to substantiate its revised
version of what had actually occurred.8 4 As in Giordano, those
affidavits indicated that Will Wilson had done nothing. Instead,
his two Deputies, Henry E. Petersen and Harold Shapiro, had
signed and forwarded the Will Wilson letters.85 Sol Linden-
baum's affidavit admitted that in the case of one application he
had personally initialed the form memorandum addressed to
Will Wilson, but stated that the Attorney General himself had
performed that act in the case of the first application.86 The
government also submitted the affidavit of the former Attorney
General, John N. Mitchell. The affidavit asserted that Mitchell
had "approved" the first authorization request and had "per-
sonally initialled [a] memorandum of that date reflecting my
favorable action," and described the form memorandum as
constituting notice to Wilson "that the discretionary action of
approving the request to make application to the court for an
interception order was taken by me. '87
The district court suppressed the wiretap evidence derived
from the second application because neither the Attorney Gen-
eral nor a specially designated Assistant Attorney General had
authorized its submission to the issuing judge; the court of
appeals affirmed.88 As to the first application, however, both
courts assumed, despite the defendant's contentions to the
contrary, that by personally initialing the form memorandum
addressed to Will Wilson the Attorney General had "personally
82 416 U.S. at 566.
8 3 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1970).
81 416 U.S. at 565-66.
8- See affidavits of Henry E. Petersen and Harold Shapiro. Appendix at 85-86,
89-90, United States v. Chavez. 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
86 The affidavit is quoted in the court of appeals' opinion. 478 F.2d at 513-14.
87 The affidavit is quoted in id.
88 Id. at 517 (quoting the unreported district court opinion).
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approved" the authorization request.8 9  Nevertheless, even
under these circumstances both courts ordered suppression of
the fruits of the first application because the application and
order did not correctly identify the authorizing officer as the
Attorney General himself.90
In affirming the lower court's decision on this basis, the
court of appeals recognized it was acting contrary to most other
decisions. 91 Most courts had held that if the Attorney General
personally participated in the authorization process, the mis-
identification of Will Wilson as the authorizing officer would
not require suppression of the electronic interceptions. 9 The
lower courts reached this conclusion on a variety of grounds.
Some simply characterized the misidentification of the au-
thorizing officer as "irrelevant, '93 "immaterial,' 94 or at most
"harmless error. '95 Other courts asserted that suppression was
unwarranted because such misidentification had neither preju-
diced the defendants96 nor deceived the courts in any material
fashion.9 7 If the government had initially disclosed the true
nature of the authorization process, reasoned these courts, the
issuing judge would still have granted the order.98
89 Id. at 515. This scenario was repeated in the Supreme Court. Respondent's Brief
in Opposition to Granting Certiorari at 1-4, United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562
(1974); Brief for the Respondent George Apodaca at 2-4, id. See also note 203 infra.
90 478 F.2d at 517.
91 Id. at 515-16.
' 2 See cases cited in id. at 516 n.1 and in United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007,
1017-18 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
9' United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 918 (1974).
'4 United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163, 169 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
'5 United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 417 U.S.
903 (1974); see United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 880 n.65 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
H United States v. Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1973); United
States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 474
F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); United States v. Consiglio, 342 F.
Supp. 556, 560-61 (D. Conn. 1972); cf. United States v. Ciamacco, 362 F. Supp. 107,
113 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973) (no prejudice to defendants be-
cause government filed affidavits giving revised version of what had occurred well in
advance of trial).
97 United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556, 560 n.6 (D. Conn. 1972); cf.
United States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259, 264 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 417 U.S.
903 (1974).
98 United States v. Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. 1368, 1373-74 (S.D. Fla. 1973); United
States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 474
F:2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); see Giordano I, 469 F.2d at 530,
quoted in note 46 supra.
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Some lower courts also refused for policy reasons to sup-
press wiretap evidence on the grounds of misidentifications.
They reasoned that the legislative purposes of the identifica-
tion requirements were to assure the formulation and uniform
application of Justice Department policy by an identifiable
high-level official. 99 Because they believed that the Attorney
General's personal participation in the authorization process
substantially satisfied those congressional purposes, they
thought suppression in such circumstances would elevate "form
over substance."'100 They flatly refused to construe the identifi-
cation requirements of the statute so inflexibly as to require
suppression in such cases.' 0 '
On the other hand, a minority of lower courts treated the
misidentification of the authorizing officer as a very serious
matter. 0 2 They regarded the Title III identification require-
"' United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 652 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Cox,
462 F.2d 1293, 1299-1300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United
States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259, 263, 264 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 417 U.S. 903
(1974); United States v. Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. 1368, 1372-73 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
00 United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 221 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Roberts, 477 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1973) (dictum), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974);
United States v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (S.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1404
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Kohne, 347 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
101 The difficulty of reconciling refusals to suppress Title III evidence despite
violations of the statute's identification requirements with the intent of Congress
that Title III's provisions should be stringently applied, see text accompanying note 5
supra, produced a schizoid quality in the opinions of some courts. For example, in
United States v. Roberts, 477 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974),
the court of appeals stated its view that when Executive Assistant Sol Lindenbaum
authorized Title III applications on the Attorney General's behalf, he committed
only "technical errors" for which "the drastic remedy of suppression" seemed in-
appropriate. Id. at 60. Nevertheless, said the court, Congress made it perfectly clear
that the suppression remedy should apply in such cases, and that the courts had no
alternative but to comply. Id. On the other hand, in the same opinion, the court stated
that violations of Title III's identification requirements would not mandate sup-
pression, for excluding intercepted communications under such circumstances would
elevate form over substance. Id. at 59-60 (dictum). Other courts avoided the prob-
lem of reconciliation altogether by simply ignoring the identification requirements,
see, e.g., United States v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1404
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. DeCesaro, 349 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Wis. 1972); United
States v. Kohne, 347 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1972), or by straining to construe the
government's Title III documents in a manner consistent with its subsequent dis-
closures, see United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Vigi, 350 F. Supp. 1008, 1009-10 (E.D. Mich. 1972); cf. United States v.
Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259, 264 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 417 U.S. 903 (1974) (Attorney
General or his Executive Assistant was "reasonably identifiable" as the authorizing
officer); United States v. Ciamacco, 362 F. Supp. 107, 113 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 491 F.2d
751 (3d Cir. 1973) (Title III satisfied when documents identify the Attorney General
as taking some action in each particular case).
102 United States v. Brown, 351 F. Supp. 38 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:750
ments not simply as a corollary of the section 2516 author-
ization requirement, but as a separate safeguard of equal
importance. 10 3 Some also rejected the suggestion that because
the government had disclosed the full details of the authoriza-
tion process later, no substantial violations had occurred. 10 4 In
their view, Congress enacted the identification requirements
to ensure that the officials who authorized Title III applications
would act with circumspection. That congressional purpose
would be poorly served by overlooking the government's "rou-
tinely false" representation, 10 5 which permitted the true au-
thorizing officer to mask his identity until long after the
electronic interceptions, and to reveal it only if he chose to
come forward. 10 6 Some courts harshly criticized the Justice
Department's authorization procedures as an "elaborate paper
charade," 10 7 characterized by "ghost-written letters and pat-
ently false and misleading memoranda."108 They could con-
103E.g., United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 652 (3d Cir. 1972) (dictum);
United States v. Brown, 351 F. Supp. 38 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at
1056-57.
104Compare United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 652 (3d Cir. 1972) (Justice
Department has readily disclosed its actual procedures whenever asked), with United
States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532, 537 (C.D. Cal. 1972) ("It hardly fulfills the ex-
pressed intent of Congress to say that the true lines of responsibility may now be
traced by means of affidavits submitted almost two years later.").
105 United States v. Brown, 351 F. Supp. 38, 41 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
106 In contrast to those courts which concluded that the government's Title III
documents did somehow properly identify the Attorney General as the authorizing
officer, see cases cited in note 100 supra, other courts asserted that quite the opposite
was true, see, e.g., United States v. Marder, 362 F. Supp. 484, 487 (S.D. Fla. 1973),
rev'd, 496 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532, 537
(C.D. Cal. 1973). Indeed, some courts congratulated the former Attorney General on
his "apparent candor" because only through the affidavits which admitted his partici-
pation did the courts learn who had really authorized the Title III applications.
Chavez I, 478 F.2d at 517 n.2. See United States v. Marder, supra at 487. However, as
Justice Douglas pointed out in his Chavez dissent, the act of the Attorney General in
acknowledging his role could only improve the Justice Department's position;
It is simply not enough that Mitchell's responsibility is established only
after a prosecution is underway and a motion to suppress filed. After-the-fact
acceptance for the Chavez surveillance was made at no cost. The surveillance
was productive and was directed against an alleged drug trafficker, a pariah of
society. Accepting responsibility at this point, further, helped Mitchell and
the Justice Department avoid the acute embarrassment of losing this prose-
cution. But this was not the scheme created by the Congress.
416 U.S. at 591 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
107 Chavez 1, 478 F.2d at 515; United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 502 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Sklaroff, 362 F. Supp. 478, 483-84
(S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1974).
118 United States v. Sklaroff, 362 F. Supp. 478, 483 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd, 500
F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1974).
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ceive of no justification for the procedures employed except
the "apparently deliberate deception of the courts by the
highest law officers in the land."'10 9
Justice White's majority opinion in Chavez rejected such
criticisms. Although concluding that the Justice Department
procedures did not comply with the statute's identification
requirements, the majority refused to believe that deliberate
deception was involved." 0 They reached this conclusion be-
cause they could perceive no purpose which deception would
serve; an issuing judge would be no less likely to grant a Title
III order authorized by the Attorney General than one autho-
rized by Will Wilson."' Moreover, the majority decided that
the identification requirements of the statute did not "directly
and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit
the use" of Title III procedures.1 2 Consequently, although
the Justice Department's misidentification of the authorizing
officer was improper, that impropriety did not fall within that
limited class of violations described in Giordano to which the
suppression remedy exclusively applied."
3
The majority concluded that the Title III identification
requirements were not "a central safeguard in preventing
abuse" ' 4 for two reasons. First, they emphasized the impor-
tance of the authorization aspect of the authorization-identifi-
cation requirements, concluding that the Attorney General's
personal approval of the application satisfied the fundamental
congressional purpose of the regulations.1 15 Secondly, the
majority asserted that Congress enacted the identification re-
quirements only to facilitate performance of the issuing judge's
responsibilities to determine in each case that authorization
had, in fact, occurred and to report to the Administrative Office
of the federal courts concerning each Title III application sub-
mitted for his consideration." 6 In particular, the majority
109 Chavez I, 478 F.2d at 517. See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 502 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Sklaroff, 362 F. Supp. 478,
483-84 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1974).
110 416 U.S. at 572.
"I Id.
112 Id. at 575.
113 See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
14 416 U.S. at 571.
119 Id. at 573-78.
116 Id. at 575-79; see 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (1970); S. REP., supra note 3, at 2196. Else-
where in the opinion Justice White recognized that the identification requirements
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rejected the suggestion that Congress intended the identifica-
tion requirements, by themselves, "to occupy a central, or even
functional, role in guarding against unwarranted use of wire-
tapping or electronic surveillance."
'1 17
The four dissenting Justices reached an opposite conclu-
sion. In their view, Congress enacted the identification require-
ments as "a significant deterrent to reckless or needless elec-
tronic surveillance."' 18 They believed that the central purpose
of the authorization requirement may be defeated unless the
identity of the responsible authorizing officer is fixed in the
original applications and order, as Title III unequivocally
requires. 119 As the majority itself recognized, Congress adopted
the authorization requirement of section 2516 to ensure that
law enforcement agencies did not seek Title III court orders
until a high level, politically accountable official had made a
personal determination that electronic intrusions were justified
in the circumstances of each case. 120  Congress enacted the
authorization requirement in order to foster a policy of re-
straint. 12 ' However, if the authorizing officer can conceal his
identity until he chooses to reveal it, all impetus for that policy
of restraint is lost.' 22  Thus, Congress adopted the identifi-
cation requirements as a mechanism by which to compel the
serve other purposes as well. "Requiring identification of the authorizing official in
the application facilitates the court's ability to conclude that the application has been
properly approved under § 2516; requiring identification in the court's order also
serves to 'fix responsibility' for the source of the preliminary approval." 416 U.S. at
575. Furthermore, the Court stated in Giordano, Congress intended to assure proper
authorization before interceptions occurred, id. at 523 n.12. Only by enforcing the
identification requirements could the Court ensure compliance with that objective.
Nevertheless, Justice White felt free to discount the identification requirements largely
because they were a relatively recent addition to the safeguards Congress had con-
sidered over the years and because Senate Report No. 1097, supra note 3, did not include
a sufficiently elaborate statement of the purpose of the identification requirements to
refute the contention that only the facilitation of the reporting requirements of
§ 2519 was involved. 416 U.S. at 578-79; see notes 8-9supra.
11 416 U.S. at 578.
1"8 Id. at 594 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
'19Id. at 595-96.
'2 Giordano II, 416 U.S. at 512-13.
121Id. at 527-29.
122 [I]t is clear that this personal responsibility and political accountability,
relied on by Congress to check the reckless use of electronic surveillance, is
rendered a mere chimera when the official actually authorizing a wiretap
application is not identified until years after the tap has occurred, when he
might already be out of office, when the usefulness of the tap is already estab-
lished, when it is clear that the surveillance was not abusive, and then only
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authorizing officer to assume personal responsibility and
political accountability for an electronic intrusion before it
occurred. By tolerating the Justice Department's misleading
procedures and condoning the after-the-fact acknowledgement
of the Attorney General's role by means of an ex post facto affi-
davit, concluded the dissenters, the majority undercut the
whole structure of the authorization requirement.
The dissenters also rejected the majority's interpretation
of section 2518(10)(a), which limited the statutory suppression
sanction to those Title III requirements "directly and sub-
stantially" restricting the use of electronic surveillance tech-
niques to clearly appropriate cases. 123 Although the dissenters'
discussion of section 2518(10)(a) was less than comprehen-
sive, 124 it appears that their objections were warranted. The
reasons for this conclusion-stated only in part by the dissent-
ing opinion-are the subject of Part II.
II. THE SUPPRESSION SANCTION
Section 2518(10)(a) authorizes individuals with standing
in adversary proceedings to move to suppress electronically
intercepted communications because the interception was un-
lawful, because the interception order was insufficient on its
face, or because the interception did not conform to the inter-
ception order. 25 The Supreme Court concluded that section
2518(10)(a) would require suppression in Giordano-type cases,
in which Sol Lindenbaum, rather than the Attorney General,
initialed the memorandum addressed to Will Wilson; but
would not require suppression in cases like Chavez, in which
the Attorney General personally participated but the appli-
through voluntary admissions or the sifting of potentially contradictory
affidavits. Responsibility is hardly "focused," and the "lines of responsibility"
are gossamer at best. This is why Congress added the demand that responsi-
bility be immediatelyfixed.
Chavez II, 416 U.S. at 593-94 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
123 Id. at 584-85.
124 The dissenters discounted the legislative history of Title III and emphasized
that the text of the statute contained no provision permitting the courts to distinguish
between "central safeguards" and other Title III requirements which were less than
central. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973, 978 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc)
(Clark, J., dissenting) ("[T]he law being unambiguous, resort to legislative history is
inappropriate.").
25 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
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cation and order misidentified Will Wilson as the authorizing
officer.
126
The difficulty with the majority position is that it deni-
grated the importance of section 2515, which flatly prohibits
the use or derivative use of intercepted communications "if
the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
chapter." 127 In Gelbard v. United States, the Court stated that
"[t]he unequivocal language of § 2515 expresses the funda-
mental policy adopted by Congress on the subject of wiretap-
ping and electronic surveillance ... strictly to limit the employ-
ment of those techniques of acquiring information."'128 Title
III permits electronic interceptions only pursuant to a section
2516 authorization and to a court order, which a judge "may
grant in conformity with Section 2518."129 Section 2518 in-
cludes a detailed procedure for authorizing electronic inter-
ceptions. Among other things, it describes the specific infor-
mation a sworn application must include, the explicit findings
the issuing judge must make before granting an interception
order, and the restrictions and limitations such an order should
contain.1 30 In Gelbard the Court stated that Congress intended
to permit the interception and disclosure of private commu-
nications only upon compliance with these "stringent condi-
tions" and that section 2515 was central to the entire legisla-
tive scheme.
131
But in Giordano the Supreme Court majority barely men-
tioned section 2515's evidentiary prohibition, asserting instead
that section 2518(10)(a) would govern "what disclosures are
forbidden, and are subject to motions to suppress." 132 Thus,
section 2515's reference to all disclosures which "would be in
violation of this chapter" was effectively narrowed to only those
126 See text accompanying notes 75-78, 112-17 supra.
2
7 
See note 65 supra.
125 408 U.S. 41, 47 (1972).
129 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970), quoted in note 6 supra.
'10 See note 4 supra.
131 408 U.S. at 46, 50.
132 The pertinent passage of the majority's opinion reads as follows:
Section 2515 provides that no part of the contents of any wire or oral
communication, and no evidence derived therefrom, may be received at
certain proceedings, including -trials, "if the disclosure of that information
would be in violation of this chapter." What disclosures are forbidden, and
are subject to motions to suppress, is in turn governed by § 2518(10)(a), which
provides for suppression of evidence on the following grounds ....
416 U.S. at 524; see also Chavez II, id. at 570-7 1. In fact, disclosure is governed not only
by §§ 2515 and 2518(10)(a), but also by the broader provisions of § 2517.
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disclosures which violated the specific grounnds of section
2518(1O)(a).
133
In fact, whether the Congress intended to limit section
2515 in this fashion is uncertain. The legislative history is
ambiguous. The Senate Judiciary Committee's report concern-
ing Title III does describe section 2518(10)(a) as limiting the
evidentiary sanction of section 2515, but it appears that the
real purpose of section 2518(10)(a) was to provide an explicit
remedy "for the right created by section 2515" while restrict-
ing that right to those persons who would have standing to
object to unlawful interceptions under existing law.
134
Furthermore, whether Congress intended to limit section
2515's evidentiary sanction to just those situations described in
section 2518(10)(a) assumes importance only because the Su-
preme Court majority interpreted the latter section in such a
narrow fashion. If the Court's construction of section
2518(10)(a) had comprehended all violations of Tide III's
requirements and thus coincided with the scope of section
2515, legislative intent would not be an issue. In other words,
the key to the Supreme Court's Chavez decision was its con-
struction in Giordano of section 2518(10)(a).
In Giordano, Justice White accepted some of the govern-
ment's argument that because paragraphs (ii) and (iii) encom-
passed statutory violations, paragraph (i) must be restricted
to violations of constitutional dimensions. 35 However, he
refused to accept the obvious implication of this analysis: that
no purely statutory violation in obtaining a Title III order
would make subsequent interceptions "unlawful" in terms of
13 Cf Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47 (1972), in which the Court,
assuming that the interception of the communications of grand jury witnesses had
not been in conformity with Title III's "stringent conditions," concluded that § 2515
would forbid questioning the witnesses on the basis of those interceptions without in-
quiring whether the Title III violations fell within the specific grounds of § 2518(10)(a).
34 Senate Report No. 1097 identifies the purpose of § 2518(10)(a) as defining
"the class entitled to make a motion to suppress," S. REP., supra note 3, at 2185, and
establishing the "remedy for the right created by section 2315," id. 2195. Gelbard zo.
United States itself demonstrates that Title III forbids disclosures even in the situations
to which a § 2518(10)(a) motion to suppress does not apply. In Gelbard the Court
ruled that, although motions to suppress may not be made in the context of grand
jury proceedings under § 2518(10)(a), compelling an immunized witness to answer
questions suggested by improperly intercepted communications was forbidden. 408
U.S. at 51-52.
,35 Giordano II, 416 U.S. at 525. The government's construction of § 2518(I0)(a)(i)
was in part confirmed by the omission from that section of a fourth ground for
suppression-lack of probable cause-which had appeared in earlier drafts and was
apparently omitted because it was regarded as unnecessary. Id. at 525-26.
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paragraph (i). Instead, he devised a distinction between statu-
tory provisions which directly limited the use of electronic
surveillance techniques and provisions which did not.
136
Justice White's analysis is subject to criticism on a number
of counts. In the first place, many interception orders or pro-
cedures which would violate the statutory provisions to which
paragraphs (ii) and (iii) refer would also violate the Constitu-
tion.1 37 Consequently, the distinction between those paragraphs
as referring only to statutory violations and paragraph (i) as
referring only to constitutional violations is artificial.
Secondly, the assumption that Congress intended any of
the three paragraphs to refer to constitutional restrictions or
requirements is questionable.1 38 With the exception of prob-
able cause standards, 139 nothing in the Senate Report or in the
statute itself suggests an intention to incorporate by reference
whatever doctrinal variations the courts might adopt in con-
struing the fourth amendment. Indeed, other sections of the
1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act suggest
quite the opposite intention. 40 Congress did seek to conform
its procedure to the requirements of Berger v. New York 14 1 and
136 Id. at 527-28.
137 For example, § 2516 permits law enforcement officers to engage in electronic
interceptions pursuant to a court order granted in conformity to § 2518. Such a
court order would not satisfy § 2518(10)(a)(ii) if it failed to include the instructions
and restrictions which that section requires: it would be insufficient on its face. In
many instances it would also offend the fourth amendment. Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(4)(b) (order must specify the nature and location of facilities as to which, or
the place where, authority to intercept is granted); id. § 2518(4)(e) (order must specify
period of time during which such interception is authorized); and id. § 2518(8)(a)
(immediately upon expiration of order agents must make return of recording of
intercepted communications to the issuing court), with Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 58-60 (1967). Furthermore, the failure of government agents to conduct an elec-
tronic surveillance in conformity to the statutorily mandated requirements of an
interception order may also offend the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. East-
man, 465 F.2d 1057, 1062-64 (3d Cir. 1973) (failure to notify subjects of electronic
interceptions that surveillance occurred); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233,
248 (D.D.C. 1971) (failure to minimize interceptions).
138Justice White made this assumption because he regarded the alternative as
"most unlikely." Giordano H, 416 U.S. at 526.
139 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970); S. REP., supra note 3, at 2191.
140 Title II of the Act included several provisions intended to change judge-made
rules which the Supreme Court had enunciated either pursuant to its supervisory
power over the federal courts or pursuant to its ultimate authority to interpret the
Constitution. Those provisions, if valid, would overrule United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), repeal the McNabb-Mallory rule, see McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), and eliminate the
mandatory warning requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 18
U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3502 (1970). See text accompanying note 145 infra.
141 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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Katz v. United States142 by detailed legislative provisions.143 It
reasonably could conclude that those provisions comprehended
and, in some respects, exceeded the constitutional require-
ments.' 44 It might even believe that if those provisions relaxed
judge-made standards, the statute would control.
45
Thirdly, Justice White's construction of paragraph (i) was
intended to save paragraphs (ii) and (iii) from the ignominy
of surplusage, 46 but the construction he adopted failed to do
so. Unless one infers that the statutory prohibitions in para-
graphs (ii) and (iii) were not intended to "play a central role in
the statutory scheme,"' 47 such violations would also be compre-
hended within Justice White's interpretation of paragraph (i).
Finally, Justice White's construction is questionable be-
cause paragraph (i) is susceptible to other equally plausible
interpretations. One possible interpretation of paragraph (i)
of section 2518(10)(a) would construe the phrase "unlawfully
intercepted" exactly as that concept is used in Title III's criminal
provision, section 2511. Section 2511(1) prescribes criminal
penalties for the willful interception of wire or oral communi-
cations except as specifically provided by the Title III proce-
dure, and for the willful disclosure or use of the contents of
such communications by any person having reason to know that
the interception was criminal. 148 Section 2511(2) then describes
four situations in which the willful interception, disclosure, or
142 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
143 S. REP., supra note 3, at 2113, 2163.
141 Examples of provisions of Title III which go beyond the Constitution's re-
quirements include the authorization requirement of § 2516(1); the provisions of
§ 2516 which make electronic surveillance available only in cases of certain serious
crimes; and the provision of § 2518(6) permitting issuing judges to require periodic
reports during the duration of the order.
145 See generally Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT.
REv. 81, 118-23, 131-34; Note, Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 25 STAN. L. REv. 885, 898-902 (1973).
146 Giordano II, 416 U.S. at 526.
147 1d. at 528.
148 Section 2511(1) establishes criminal penalties for any person who commits
any one of four categories of acts "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this
chapter." The four proscribed categories are: (a) willfully intercepting or attempting
to intercept any wire or oral communication, or procuring another to do so; (b) will-
fully using or attempting to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to inter-
cept oral communications under circumstances subject to congressional regulation, or
procuring another to do so; (c) willfully disclosing or attempting to disclose to another
the contents of any wire or oral communication, "knowing or having reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral com-
munication in violation of this subsection;" and (d) willfully using or attempting to use
the contents of any wire or oral communication, "knowing or having reason to know
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use of communications which would otherwise offend section
2511(1) "shall not be unlawful."
1 49
Under this approach, paragraph (i) of section 2518(10)(a)
would mandate suppression whenever the disclosure or use of
the challenged evidence would constitute a crime under sec-
tion 251 1(1).1 50 The moving party would have to demonstrate
that the original interception was willfully made in conformity
with the statute's requirements; the suppression of intercepted
communications would be required if the government willfully
violated even "technical" requirements relating to the Title
III application, a result not inconsistent with section 2515.
This construction of paragraph (i) would not require sup-
pression of communications improperly intercepted in the
belief that the interception was proper; the good faith of the
interceptor would be a defense to the suppression motion. But
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral com-
munication in violation of this subsection." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a), (b), (c), (d) (1970)
(emphasis added). See note 150 infra.
149 The four situations are those in which a party to the communication has con-
sented to its interception and the interception is accomplished either under color of
law or privately, but for a lawful purpose; in which an officer, employee, or agent of a
communications common carrier or a switchboard operator intercepts a wire com-
munication in the normal course of employment or under other specified circum-
stances; or in which an officer, agent, or employee of the Federal Communications
Commission intercepts a wire or radio communication in the performance of an
official duty. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) (1970).
150 One should distinguish between the proposed construction of § 2518(10)(a)(i)
and the similar but erroneous construction given to the same paragraph by some
lower courts and, apparently, by the Chavez dissenters. The proposed construction
would permit suppression pursuant to § 2518(10)(a)(i) whenever the moving party
demonstrated that the use or disclosure of the intercepted communication would
violate the criminal proscriptions of subparagraphs (c) or (d) of § 2511(1). See note
148 supra. Thus, the proposed construction would require the moving party to
demonstrate that the person proposing to use or disclose the intercepted communi-
cation knew or had reason to know that the interception of the communication (1)
violated the provisions of Title III and (2) was willfully accomplished. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1)(a) (1970). Otherwise, the party proposing to use or disclose the intercepted
communication would not know or have reason to know that the interception of the
communication occurred in violation of "this subsection."
By contrast, some lower courts assumed that the use or disclosure of an inter-
cepted communication would be "unlawful" within the meaning of subparagraphs (c)
or (d) of § 2511(1), and therefore subject to suppression pursuant to § 2518(10)(a)(i),
if the party proposing to use or disclose the communication knew or had reason to
know that it was intercepted in violation of the provisions "of this chapter." United
States v. Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Narducci,
341 F. Supp. 1107, 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See Chavez I1, 416 U.S. at 584-87 (opinion of
Douglas, J.). Such a construction fails to recognize that the interception of the com-
munication must have occurred willfully as well as in violation of Title III's require-
ments in order to offend the criminal proscription of § 251 l(1)(a). See also Giordano II,
416 U.S. at 529 n.18,
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to the extent that the government submitted in good faith an
application which included constitutional defects, the courts
presumably could suppress the Title III evidence regardless of
the absence of any specific statutory authority.' 5 ' Nor would
good faith avoid the suppression sanction if the defect com-
plained of violated paragraphs (ii) or (iii).
A passage from the Chavez dissent suggests another pos-
sible explanation of the three paragraphs of section 2518(10)(a).
Justice Douglas criticized the majority's narrow interpreta-
tion of paragraph (i) as follows:
The choice seems to be between attributing to
Congress a degree of excessive cautiousness which
led to some redundancy in drafting the protective
provisions of § 2518(10)(a), or foolishness which led
Congress to enact statutory provisions for law enforce-
ment officials to scurry about satisfying when it did not
consider the provisions significant enough to enforce
by suppression. In view of the express prohibition
by § 2515 of disclosure of information "in violation"
of the chapter, I would opt for the conclusion that
Congress was excessively cautious, and that "unlaw-
fully intercepted" means what it says.
152
This approach suggests that any interception which does not
conform to any of Title III's requirements should be subject
to suppression under section 2518(10)(a). Although this ap-
proach to paragraph (i) would make paragraphs (ii) and (iii)
redundant, it has considerable appeal. It would define as "un-
lawful" any electronic interception, disclosure, or use of any
intercepted communication, unless specific Title III provisions
explicitly permitted, and would make suppression available to
aggrieved persons in any case in which the disclosure or use of
the intercepted communications would violate section 2515.
Defining the phrase in paragraph (i), "unlawfully inter-
cepted," in terms of the section 2515 prohibition deviates
from the more narrow concept of unlawfulness which Con-
gress employed in section 2511(1). 153 But there is reason to
151 See Cook v. United States, 401 U.S. 996 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (whether
wiretap evidence was properly seized depends not upon Title III or administrative
practice, but upon the fourth amendment), denying cert. to 432 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir.
1970).
152 416 U.S. at 586 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
153 Coinpare § 2515, quoted in note 65 supra, with § 251 I(1), discussed in note 148 supra.
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believe that such a broader definition would not offend the
canons of statutory construction. 154 Furthermore, paragraphs
(ii) and (iii) of section 2518(10)(a) are not limited by the element
of willfulness included in the criminal provisions, 155 indicating
Congress' intention to make the suppression remedy available
on a considerably broader scale.
Furthermore, Congress itself suggested in the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970156 that a violation of any Title III
provision should fall within the section 2518(10)(a)(i) definition
of an unlawful interception. One provision of that statute157
establishes a new procedure for suppressing the fruits of illegal
electronic interceptions, and provides for limited disclosure
of intercepted communications which the court finds to be the
fruit of "an unlawful act." The statute defines "an unlawful
act" to include any electronic interception made "in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any regula-
tion or standard promulgated pursuant thereto."'158 This defi-
nition of unlawful acts subject to suppression appears to
comprehend violations of any Title III provision, not just those
specified in section 2518(10)(a).1 59
In contrast with these suggested alternatives, Justice
White's interpretation of section 2518(10)(a) suffers from its
failure to account for section 2515.160 Justice White's inter-
' See Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
'-5 Not only do the criminal proscriptions of § 2511(1) specify willfulness as a
necessary element, Giordano II, 416 U.S. at 529 n.18, but Congress also explicitly pro-
vided that good faith reliance upon an interception order would constitute a com-
plete defense in any action seeking to impose Title III's civil or criminal penalties.
18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970).
1-6 84 Stat. 922 (codified in various sections of 18 U.S.C.).
157 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970).
158 Id. § 3504(b).
151 A possible, if unlikely, reading interprets the three paragraphs of § 2518(10)(a)
in an internally consistent manner by assuming that paragraph (i) refers to inter-
ceptions conducted without the authority of any interception order whatsoever, see
United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 217, 219 n.1 (D.D.C. 1973). Congress clearly in-
tended to prohibit such interceptions or the disclosure of their fruits by all available
means. S. REP., supra note 3, at 2153-54, 2180-82. Of course, such an interpretation
of paragraph (i) would make suppression inapplicable to situations in which the
court issued a facially sufficient order on the basis of a defective application; but
Congress might have assumed that the substantial responsibilities which other pro-
visions of the statute imposed upon issuing judges would make reference to such
situations unnecessary. Note that this proposed construction of § 2518(10)(a) also
assumes that Congress intended to limit the evidentiary sanction of § 2515 to only
those situations described in § 2518(10)(a); but see text accompanying notes 127-34
supra.
110 See text accompanying notes 127-31 supra.
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pretation may be supportable, but is by no means compelled
by the words of section 2518(10)(a).16' And, as the Chavez dis-
sent noted, Justice White's interpretation assumes a license
"to pick and choose" among the various provisions of Title
III and to withhold the suppression sanction unless the chal-
lenged interception procedure violates what the courts con-
sider a "central" statutory provision. 62 There is no legislative
history to support the view that the courts were to exercise
discretion on this basis; Justice White extrapolated it from the
undeniable importance of the authorization requirement, ig-
noring the equally great importance Congress attached to the
evidentiary sanction of section 2515.
III. INSTITUTIONALIZED DECEPTION
By limiting Title III's suppression sanction to statutory
violations which offend a "central safeguard" and by deciding
that Title III's identification requirements serve no such pur-
pose, the majority ignored an important aspect of the Justice
Department's authorization procedure: aside from the possible
culpability of any individual involved, the government's routine
misrepresentations concerning the authorization process con-
stituted an institutionalized practice of deception. From the
time that the Justice Department began using the Tide III pro-
cedure until the spring of 1972, when the Department sub-
stantially revised its authorizing process, government attorneys
routinely misrepresented the facts of that authorizing process
in over 525 Title III proceedings. 163 There is no question that
the government documents persuaded the issuing judges that
authorization had occurred as described.164 As several courts
,61 This is the very criticism Justice Rehnquist leveled against the Gelbard ma-
jority's interpretation of Title III. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 71 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162 416 U.S. at 586 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
163 Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 4; see text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
To reiterate, the government made these misrepresentations in three ways. First,
government attorneys seeking Title III orders would submit sworn applications which
asserted that the Attorney General had specially designated Assistant Attorney
General Will Wilson to act and that Wilson had authorized submission of the Tide III
application to the issuing judge. Second, the applying attorneys would also submit
proposed orders to the issuing judges which included a finding that the application
had been authorized as described. Third, the applying attorneys would include as
exhibits to their sworn applications what purported to be personal letters to them
from Will Wilson authorizing the attorneys to submit the applications.
'
6 4 See Chavez I, 478 F.2d at 515; United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 500 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Marder, 362 F. Supp. 484,
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noted, these documents created the "unmistakable impression"
that Will Wilson had made the discretionary decision which
section 2516(1) required. 165 Nor is there any question that the
government attorneys who actually submitted these documents
to the issuing judges did so in good faith.16 6 The applying
attorneys were as misled concerning their authority to proceed
as were the issuing judges, and undoubtedly they were equally
surprised when the Justice Department disclosed its new ver-
sion of what had actually occurred.
However, the good faith of the individual attorneys who
actually submitted the Title III documents does not excuse the
misstatements involved. Nor is it sufficient to explain away
those misstatements as a regrettable, but inevitable, result of
"a perpetual bureaucratic tendency.' 1 67 As a matter of plain
fact, the high-level officials who established the Justice Depart-
ment's authorization procedure and approved the use of the
form documents knew those documents were false.16 8 Those
officials have admitted knowing the text of the Will Wilson
letter, the Title III application, and the proposed court order;
169
486 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd, 496 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Sklaroff,
362 F. Supp. 478, 480-81, 484 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1974).
'6 5 See United States v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp. 1112, 1114-16 (N.D. Ga. 1973),
rev'd, 496 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 55-56
(S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd per curiam, 496 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
"6 See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 505 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
846 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 56 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd per
curiam, 496 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
167 United States v. Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
168 At the Marder evidentiary hearing, see note 14 supra, former Attorney General
John N. Mitchell testified that the Department processed requests for authorization
according to a standard procedure. iWarder Record, supra note 14, at 43; see Giordano
Brief, supra note 17, at 4-9. Several of the other Justice Department officials testified
that they had played some role in establishing that standard procedure and were to
some degree responsible for the procedures actually employed. Marder Record, supra
note 14, at 151 (Petersen), 224 (Lindenbaum), 264 (Wilson). As to the knowledge of
these officials, see notes 169-71 infra & accompanying text. Only Will Wilson himself
testified that he was unfamiliar with the representations made in the Tide III appli-
cations concerning his role and that he did not know that applying attorneys were
submitting the "Will Wilson" letters to the issuing judges. Marder Record, supra note
14, at 261, 268, 271. "I did not know exactly what use was made of them," he said.
Id. 261.
169 At the Marder hearing, Mitchell testified that the government file on each Title
III application would contain the application, supporting affidavit, proposed court
order, the "Will Wilson" letter, and the form memorandum from the Attorney
General to Wilson as well as various memoranda summarizing the facts of the particular
application and recommending that the application be authorized. Marder Record,
supra note 14, at 38-39, 61-63, 83-85. He testified that in each case he would read
parts, if not all of these documents, id. 63, 119. He explicitly admitted knowing the
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they knew what representations those documents made con-
cerning the authorization process.17 0 At least some of them
knew that the applying attorneys would submit the false Will
Wilson letters to the issuing judges in order to corroborate
their asserted authority to act.' 7 ' Although these high officials
did not personally mislead the issuing judges, they knowingly
participated in a process which caused others to do so. To the
extent that the government is treated as an entity, 7 2 therefore,
it is responsible for communicating to the courts statements of
facts known to be untrue.
7 3
contents of the "Will Wilson" letter, but stated he did not know if Wilson, in fact,
reviewed the files, id. 80-82; nor did he know that Wilson was not signing the "Will
Wilson" letters, id. 82.
Henry Petersen testified that he normally reviewed Title III files on behalf of the
Criminal Division before the Attorney General would see them, id. 140-41. He knew
that the proposed court orders and the "Will Wilson" letter suggested that Wilson
was the authorizing official, id. 168, 178.
Sol Lindenbaum also testified that he would review Title III files before the
Attorney General would see them, id. 208. See also note 43 supra. He also admitted
some responsibility for the specific language employed in the form memorandum ad-
dressed to Will Wilson. Marder Record, supra note 14, at 224.
Will Wilson admitted some familiarity with the contents of the "Will Wilson" letters
and, in fact, testified that in 1969, he even signed a few, id. 259-60, 271. Further-
more, he apparently played some role in the review process in some individual cases,
id. 83, 103, 170. However, he disclaimed knowledge of the purposes for which the
"Will Wilson" letters were used; see note 168 supra.
Harold Shapiro testified that he normally handled Title III applications only
when Petersen was unavailable, Marder Record, supra note 14, at 227. See also note 41
supra.
Various witnesses also testified that, until the government's disclosures, no one
outside of the office of the Attorney General knew that anyone besides Mitchell him-
self was initialling the form memoranda or purporting to approve Title III applica-
tions. Marder Record, supra note 14, at 155-56, 261.
170 Mitchell, Petersen, and Wilson specifically testified to such knowledge.
Marder Record, supra note 14, at 100-0 1, 168, 259-60.
'71 Id. 82 (Mitchell), 168 (Petersen), 222 (Lindenbaum). But see note 168 supra
(Wilson).
172 The Supreme Court has ruled that "the prosecutor's office is an entity" and
that the government is bound by the knowledge or promises of any of its representa-
tives, even if unknown to his associates or superiors, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 263 (1971). The Court
also has suggested that prosecutors are ethically responsible for the conduct of police
officials in connection with pending cases. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320
(1973).
272 The government also contended before the Supreme Court that its Title III
documents involved no misrepresentations because the reports which it submitted
annually to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts indicated that the
Attorney General had "personally approved each of the reported applications and.
as authorized by provisions of Title 18 U.S.C.. Section 2316. specially designated an
Assistant Attorney General to authorize its filing." Giordano Brief. supra note 17. at 8;
see note 116 supra & accompanying text. However, such disclosures certainly were
not made known to the issuing judges. particularly at the time they reviewed the Title
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Ironically, most courts, including the Supreme Court, have
been more than willing to overlook the implications of this
conduct, 174 avoiding the issue by asserting that the deception
served no purpose because the orders could have been obtained
by following orthodox procedures.17 5 If the government had
actually identified the Attorney General as the authorizing
officer in its Title III applications, it undoubtedly would have
enjoyed the same high success rate in securing interception
orders from the federal courts.1
7 6
Why, then, did the Justice Department engage in this de-
ception? There is no firm answer, but one explanation does
exist. The Justice Department may have used its misleading
Title III documents to foster the appearance of scrupulous
compliance with section 2516(1) while actually employing a
procedure which it regarded as more bureaucratically desirable
than that which the statute required.
77
The government's disclosures concerning the authorization
process indicate its actual reviewing procedures conformed
to a bureaucratic model.178 Each Title III application under-
III applications. Commonly, the Administrative Office publishes its summaries of
Title III activity in April of the year following the calendar year during which the
activity occurred, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 13. Furthermore,
as Justice Douglas pointed out, the government's annual reports for the calendar
years following 1969 "did not acknowledge that Mitchell had personally authorized
the surveillance attributed to his subordinates." Chavez II, 416 U.S. at 595-96 (opinion
of Douglas, J.).
'74 See, e.g., United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
M See text accompanying notes 91-98 & 110-11 supra. It may have been important
who in fact authorized the Title III applications. District court judges are experi-
enced at determining probable cause for a search warrant, but may have encountered
greater difficulty in Title III cases when assessing the need for electronic surveillance
or the reasonable duration of a proposed intrusion. In such cases, a judge might
well defer to the judgment of the authorizing officer identified in the application.
Had the judges known the true facts concerning the authorization process, they may
well have been unwilling to rely upon the representations of the government's appli-
cations and in the "Will Wilson" letters.
176 The annual reports of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
indicate that there were 525 Title III applications submitted to federal judges be-
tween 1969 and 1972 which misidentified the authorizing officer, only one of which
was refused. See note 13 supra.
117 See Giordano I, 469 F.2d at 528.
178 German sociologist Max Weber described the principle characteristics of the
classic bureaucratic model in terms of four specific functions:
(1) bureaucratic jurisdiction is precisely fixed by operating rules and regula-
tions, (2) bureaucratic structures are hierarchically organized on the basis
of a firmly established pattern of superior-subordinate relationships, (3)
the formal internal operation, or management, of the bureaucracy is ac-
complished through the transmission of intraorganizational communications,
decisions, directives, and so on, in the form of written documents, which
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went close scrutiny by specially trained, lower level officials
and then received successive reviews by supervisory officials at
increasingly higher levels of the Department. 17 9 When an
application reached the very highest levels, the reviewing
officials would know that careful examinations already had
occurred and that a series of subordinate officials had already
recommended approval.1
80
However, the Justice Department also knew that Congress
specifically adopted Title III's authorization requirement to
make certain that the judgment to seek a court order was not an
"institutional decision" effectively made by the lower echelons
of the Department.' 8' Therefore, it chose to describe the au-
thorization procedure in its Tide III applications -and other
documents in a manner which would satisfy that Congressional
concern while concealing the bureaucratic process actually
at work.
are preserved as permanent records of the organization, and (4) bureaucratic
officials must reflect a high degree of administrative specialization and
expertise, not only concerning their specific functional responsibilities, but
also concerning the operating rules, regulations, and procedures of the
bureaucratic organization itself.
L. GAWTHROP, BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 2 (1969). See
also P. BLAU & M. MEYER, BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN SOCIETY 18-23 (2d ed. 1971);
R. PRESTHUS, THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY: AN ANALYSIS AND A THEORY 5 (1962).
Furthermore, the theoretical decisionmaking structure of the bureaucratic organiza-
tion contemplates a corps of top-level officials-the policy makers-who establish
sometimes detailed and explicit criteria for action which lower-level officials then
apply to individual cases. L. GAWTHROP, supra at 15-16. In fact, however, this theo-
retical conception of bureaucratic function does not describe reality. For various
reasons relating to the inability of "policy makers" to police the actual implementation
of their directives and to the dependency of the "policy makers" upon their subor-
dinates to collect, summarize, and communicate the relevant data necessary for
policy determinations, the organization's policies are largely created by its lower
echelons. The top level "official policy makers, in many respects, become policy
ratifiers who grant organizational legitimacy to certain suggested courses of action,"
Id. 16-18, 111-18. See also P. BLAU & M. MEYER, supra at 93; P. BLAU, THE DYNAM.1ICS
OF BUREAUCRACY 123-28 (2d ed. 1963).
179 Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 4-6. See also notes 41 & 85 supra. The govern-
ment argued that this procedure satisfied the intention of Congress that the Attorney
General or a specially designated Assistant Attorney General "establish basic guide-
lines and . . . retain the ultimate responsibility for their compliance, permitting their
subordinates to act under their direction and pursuant to their policies in particular
cases." Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 55; see note 178 supra.
180 At the Marder hearing, Henry Petersen testified that the "records copy" of
each Title III file would indicate by initials the identity of each individual in the chain
of command who had reviewed the file and had recommended authorizing the appli-
cation. Marder Record, supra note 14, at 171-72. See also id. 278-79.
181 United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
918 (1974). The Justice Department disclaimed such an understanding of Congress'
intent in its Giordano brief, although section 1.2 of the Department's Title III Manual
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An examination of the text of the Will Wilson letter sup-
ports this explanation. The draftsman of that form letter took
great care to track the pertinent provisions of Title 111.182 In-
deed, the letter goes beyond the statutory requirements by
asserting that its purported author had carefully reviewed the
file and the relevant circumstances and personally had made
determinations of necessity and probable cause.1 83 Title III
requires no such findings as part of the authorization process,
but the form letter asserts them. The standardized language-of
the Title III applications and proposed court orders concern-
ing the authorizing process exhibit the same care in tracking
the statute's provisions. The "unmistakable impressions" which
these documents created concerning the authorization pro-
cess were carefully conceived and intentionally induced.
184
If the Court had recognized the intentional nature of the
government's misstatements, it might well have ordered sup-
pression by analogy to the rules which some courts employ
flatly states that the purpose of § 2516 "is to insure strict, centralized control of the
administration of Title III." Compare Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 55, with U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 7.
That Congress did intend the "authorizing officer" to make a specific decision
in each individual case is too evident to be ignored. The language of § 2516(1) clearly
contemplates that the authorizing officer will act with respect to each individual
application, and witnesses testifying in favor of a wiretap statute before Senator Mc-
Clellan's subcommittee emphasized the importance of such an individual screening
as one of the proposed statute's important protections. Hearings, supra note 8, at 171-72
(Chief Judge Lumbard of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit),
1095, 1117 (New York County District Attorney Frank Hogan). See also Giordano II,
416 U.S. at 514-22. Furthermore, ensuring such personal attention in each case was
precisely the reason that in 1961 the Justice Department itself recommended that
Congress include a provision similar to § 2516(1) in a proposed wiretap statute. See
text accompanying note 11 supra. It is difficult, if not impossible, not to conclude
that "Congress wanted to make certain that every such matter would have the personal
attention of an individual appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate."
United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 1972), remanded, 472 F.2d 973
(5th Cir. 1973) (en banc). Cf. A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEIL-
LANCE, supra note 4, at 132.
"8 See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 499-500, 504 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 846 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 55 (S.D. Fla. 1973),
rev'd per cuiam, 496 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc). Cf. Giordano Brief, supra note
17, at 7 (form memorandum to Will Wilson "tracked the language of Section 2516(1).").
18 Note 17 supra.
184 See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 504 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
846 (1973).
At the Marder hearing, various witnesses attempted to explain why the Justice
Department had included in its various Title III documents statements which clearly
appeared to describe an authorization procedure substantially different from that
which those officials testified had actually occurred. They uniformly asserted that
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when defendants challenge the factual assertions in facially
sufficient search warrant affidavits on the ground that they
contain inaccurate facts or misrepresentations. 8 5 The state
and lower federal courts presently disagree whether they should
ever consider such challenges and, if so, under which circum-
stances they should grant relief.186 Some courts follow the
traditional rule that, absent a specific statute, such challenges
the first person representations of the "Will Wilson" letter were simply intended to
reflect "institutional determinations" by the Criminal Division of the Department.
Marder Record, supra note 14, at 151-52, 260, 270. Cf. text accompanying note 181
supra. Wilson testified that the "Will Wilson" letter was of no operational significance,
but simply informed the applying attorney that his application had been approved.
Id. 267; see text accompanying notes 48-57 supra.
The witnesses encountered greater difficulty in reconciling their assertions that
the Attorney General had actually authorized Title III applications with the state-
ments in all the Title III documents that he had simply specially designated Wilson
to make that discretionary decision. The explanation they gave was that the "special
designation" to which the various Title III documents referred was not a "special
designation" within the meaning of § 2516(1), but simply the delegation of the per-
formance of a ministerial act. Id. 116, 178-79. See United States v. Roberts, 477 F.2d
57, 59 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974). For this reason the govern-
ment strongly resisted defense counsel efforts to characterize the form memorandum
from the Attorney General to Will Wilson as "a designation memo"; it contended
the memorandum was, in fact, the authorizing document. Marder Record, supra note
14, at 36, 101, 157-58, 238-40. However, this contention was severely undercut by an
internal department document which itself referred to the "Will Wilson" letter as "a
proposed letter of authorization" and to the form memorandum as "a proposed
designation memorandum." Id. 158, 240.
183 Some defendants argued a different analogy, to the requirements of former
rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Until 1972 that rule required
search warrants to identify the affiants whose statements prompted the magistrate's
finding of probable cause. (In 1972 the rule was amended to eliminate this require-
ment as "unnecessary paperwork .... A person who wishes to challenge the validity of
a search warrant has access to the affidavits upon which the warrant was issued."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 169 (1972)). Occasionally,
defendants would demonstrate that search warrants misidentified the affiants, and
most courts would suppress the fruits of the search in such cases. See, e.g., King v.
United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960); United States v. Carignan, 286 F. Supp.
284 (D. Mass. 1967). But see United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D.N.Y.
1969). At least two lower courts found this analogy persuasive when considering the
misidentification of the authorizing officer under Title III, United States v. Stanley,
360 F. Supp. 1112, 1118-19 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1057, but the
Supreme Court rejected it in an almost offhand manner, distinguishing the search
warrant affiant cases in a footnote on the grounds that the affiant's identity related to
probable cause while in Title III cases the authorizing officer's identity was immaterial
to that determination, Chavez II, 416 U.S. at 574 n.5.
116 See Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing
Evidence, 84 HARv. L. REv. 825 (1971); Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of Affidavits
for Search Warrants: Piercing the Presumption of Validity, 44 CONN. B.J. 9, 18-20 (1970);
Note, Search Warrant Affidavits: The Constitutional Constraints, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 623,
635-36 (1974); Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit: What If It's
False?, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 96 (1971); Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 394 (1949).
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are improper. 18 7 They regard the issuing magistrate's deter-
mination of the credibility of the affiant and the accuracy of
the affidavit as conclusive; only the inference drawn from the
facts stated in the affidavit-the magistrate's finding of prob-
able cause-is subject to review. Other courts do allow hearings
in some circumstances permitting defendants to dispute the
factual assertions on the basis of which the magistrate made a
finding of probable cause, but disagree among themselves
whether good faith misstatements of material fact, as opposed
to outright perjury, justify suppression.
188
Those courts which observe the traditional rule precluding
consideration of challenges assert that the fourth amendment
does not require an inquiry into the truth of the affidavit,18 9
and that such inquiries would undermine the solemnity of the
warrant-issuing procedure9 ° and encourage extensive litiga-
tion, often on frivolous grounds.' 9 ' Such courts also may be
concerned that allowing defendants to attack the factual accu-
racy of search warrant affidavits may lead in some instances
1' See, e.g., People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144, 258 N.E.2d 341, 343, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 882 (1970); State v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 314, 256 So. 2d 98, 103-04 (1971),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 911 (1972); State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 174-75, 293 A.2d 649,
653-54 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
"8 See Note, supra note 186, at 636-37. Compare United States v. Marihar, 492 F.2d
897, 899-900 (8th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 988 (7th
Cir. 1973) (en banc), with United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1973).
Much of this confusion exists because the Supreme Court has consistently declined
to decide the relevant issues, see Mitchell v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 882, denying cert. to 45
Ill. 2d 148, 258 N.E.2d 345 (1970); Tucker v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967), denying
cert. to 244 Md. 488, 224 A.2d 111 (1966); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528,
531-32 (1964); cases cited in ,note 187 supra, a reluctance which may find some ex-
planation in the difficulty that lower courts and commentators have encountered in
deducing the correct position from present fourth amendment doctrine, see Mascolo,
supra note 186, at 10. The commentators generally agree that courts should permit
defendants to attack the factual assertions in search and arrest warrant affidavits,
Forkosh, The Constitutional Right to Challenge the Content of Affidavits in Warrants Issued
Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 297, 336-40 (1973); Kipperman, supra
note 186, at 830-33; Mascolo, supra note 186, at 25-30; Note, supra note 186, at 638-39;
Comment, supra note 186, at 146-47, but they do not agree among themselves con-
cerning what circumstances should justify relief. Compare Mascolo, supra note 186,
at 30-31, and Comment, supra note 186, at 139-46, with Kipperman, supra note 186, at
830-33.
189 Note, supra note 186, at 636; see United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219, 225
(W.D. Mo. 1931); State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 174-75, 293 A.2d 649, 653-54 (1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
I1 Note, Testing the Factual Basis for a Search Warrant, 67 COLUI. L. REV. 1529,
1530 (1967).
' 1 See State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 177-78, 293 A.2d 649, 655 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 945 (1973). See also Forkosh, supra note 188, at 339-40; Note, supra note 186,
at 636.
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to unjustifiable disclosures of the identity of confidential in-
formants.
1 9 2
Those who believe that misstatements of fact in search
warrant affidavits should in some cases be subject to review
emphasize the importance of the magistrate's warrant-issuing
function. 193 To the extent that the fourth amendment re-
quires a neutral and detached magistrate to make the critical
finding of probable cause, 94 they argue, misstatements of fact
which mislead the magistrate and prevent the proper perfor-
mance of this function should not be allowed.' 95 Some courts
restrict this reasoning to intentional misrepresentations, re-
jecting the suggestion that reasonable mistakes of fact, made
by the affiant in good faith, should lead to suppression. They
limit the suppression sanction by the professed objectives of the
exclusionary rule.
196
192 See Note, supra note 190, at 1532-34; Comment, supra note 186, at 123-33.
93 See, e.g., Forkosh, supra note 188, at 305-14; Comment, supra note 186, at
107-11.
In repeated decisions, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the
magistrate's role. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-18
(1972); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). Because the fourth amendment requires the magistrate to
make a meaningful determination of probable cause, the Court has insisted that
search warrant affidavits include explicit statements of specific facts, Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), and has condemned affidavits which only assert the
affiant's own conclusions, Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958),
for "subjective good faith" is insufficient to satisfy the Constitution, Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
The commentators also emphasize that defendants should be permitted to attack
the accuracy of search warrant affidavits in order to advance the search for truth,
Mascolo, supra note 186, at 25-28, and because the reasons for the contrary rule are
simply insufficient; Kipperman, supra note 186, at 830. They would avoid the danger
of excessive litigation with which the traditional rule is so concerned by requiring
defendants to make a factual showing of positive misstatements before receiving a
hearing on the claim. See United States v. Rael, 467 F.2d 333, 336 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973); United States v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836, 840 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970); United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp.
408, 413 (D. Md. 1972). See also Mascolo, supra note 186, at 28-30.
294 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971).
'95 United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657, 662 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
852 (1973). See United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Henderson, 17 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1954).
"96 See United States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc); Note, supra note 186, at 637-38.
Those courts which suggest that even innocent misstatements of material fact
should justify suppression, United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973),
probably go too far, see 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 673, at 107
(1969); Kipperman, supra note 186, at 832-33. The Supreme Court itself has acknowl-
edged that courts should allow for reasonable mistakes by police officers in warrant-
less arrest situations, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); see Mascolo,
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Most important for the analogy to Title III, the four
federal appellate courts which have recently considered the
issue agree that suppression would be proper in the case of a
deliberate misstatement even if the misstated fact were not
essential to the magistrate's finding of probable cause. 197 That
the remaining facts stated in the affidavit would themselves
justify issuance of the warrant does not matter in such cases,
for the failure to establish probable cause is not the basis for
suppression; the sanction applies in order to vindicate the
integrity of the courts and to deprive the government of the
fruits of its misconduct. 198 These same considerations apply
equally to the Justice Department's intentional misrepresenta-
tions of its authorizing procedures in Title III cases.
It is true, of course, that the affiants in the Title III cases
-the applying attorneys-did not intentionally or recklessly
misstate the facts concerning their authorization.' 99 But the
government is institutionally responsible for acts or knowledge
to which not all its representatives are party.200 Viewed in
this light, the government's misrepresentations take on far
more serious overtones than the Supreme Court acknowledged.
If intentional or reckless misstatements by individual affiants
in ordinary search warrant cases require the suppression sanc-
tion despite their immateriality to the finding of probable
cause, surely the courts should require no less when, as an
institution, the government misleads issuing judges concern-
ing statutorily mandated findings of fact. However, neither the
Chavez majority nor the dissenters considered the purposeful
character of the government's conduct; they simply considered
whether Title III's identification requirements were central or
peripheral to the statute's safeguards. In so doing, they ignored
the most fundamental aspect of the government's authorization
procedure.
supra note 186, at 12. It would be anomolous, therefore, to test search warrant affidavits
by a higher standard, especially in view of the Court's announced preference for the
warrant procedure. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See also note 193
supra.
"17 United States v. Belculfine, 16 CRIM. L. REP. 2298 (1st Cir., Dec. 6, 1974);
United States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897, 899-900 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Carmichael, 489 F.2d -983, 988-89 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Thomas,
489 F.2d 664, 668-71 (5th Cir. 1973):
s See note 197 supra.
"o See text accompanying note 166 supra.
200 See note 172 supra.
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IV. MISRELIANCE ON ExPOSTFACTO GOVERNMENT AFFIDAVITS
The Supreme Court failed to consider another cluster of
issues which turn on the propriety of the government's use of
ex post facto affidavits and other salvaging evidence after the
disclosure of Will Wilson's nonparticipation. These issues are
important not only because they raise further questions about
the Supreme Court's decision in Chavez, but also because they
illustrate the dangers of overreliance by both the Supreme
Court and many lower federal courts upon the representations
of the government when acting as an advocate.
When the government sought to submit its affidavits to the
district court in Chavez, the defendants objected, contending
that such affidavits were improper, and requested an eviden-
tiary hearing at which they could cross-examine the authors of
the affidavits. The defendants even contended that, because
of the extraordinary discrepancies between the government's
Title III documents and its subsequent affidavits, the district
court should discredit the latter.
20 1
Both the district court and the court of appeals rejected
these contentions. They preferred to assume that by personally
initialing the memorandum addressed to Will Wilson, the
Attorney General had personally approved the authorization
request. Of course, their willingness to make this assumption
may be explained, at least in part, by its immateriality to their
ultimate decisions that the misidentification of the authorizing
officer itself required suppression of the intercepted com-
munications.
When the government petitioned the Supreme Court to
review the Chavez decision, the defendants again contended
that the record below was deficient and that certiorari there-
fore should be denied. 20 2 The Supreme Court rejected this
suggestion, and ultimately decided Chavez by assuming that
the Attorney General had personally authorized the Title III
application.2
0 3
201 See note 89 supra.
20 2 Id.
203 A careful reading of Justice White's Chavez opinion clearly indicates that he
assumed the issues relating to the Attorney General's initialling of the form memo-
randum out of existence. See United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 226-27 (8th Cir.
1974) (Bright, J., concurring). Although he recognized that both lower courts had
assumed "that the Attorney General had personally approved the request for authority
to apply for the interception order, as his affidavit stated." 416 U.S. at 568. Justice
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By making this assumption, despite its recognition that
discrepancies existed between the assertions contained in the
Tide III documents submitted to the issuing judge and the
government's subsequent representations, 20 4 the Court over-
looked two issues-one evidentiary and one a combination of
law and fact-which some lower courts have resolved in con-
flicting fashion. These issues relate to the critical determina-
tion whether the Attorney General's act of initialling the form
memorandum addressed to Will Wilson satisfied the require-
ments of section 2516(1). Resolved against the government,
they would have required the suppression of Title III inter-
ceptions even in cases in which the Attorney General person-
ally participated in the authorization process.
A. The Evidentiary Issue: Are the Government's After-
the-Fact Affidavits Admissible Evidence of What
Actually Occurred?
The government confronted a difficult problem when it
first disclosed that, contrary to its prior representation, Will
White described the issue in Chavez as whether misidentification of the authorizing
officer requires suppression "when the Attorney General has in fact authorized the
application to be made," id. at 565 (emphasis added). In stating the court's holding
on that issue, he explicitly elevated the assumption of the lower courts into a finding
of fact:
When it is clearly established, therefore, that authorization of submission
of a wiretap or electronic surveillance application has been given by the
Attorney General himself, but the application, and, as a result, the inter-
ception order, incorrectly state that approval has instead been given by a
specially designated Assistant Attorney General, the misidentification, by
itself, will not render interceptions conducted under the order "unlawful"
within the meaning of § 2518(I0)(a)(i) or the disclosure of the contents of the
intercepted communications, or derivative evidence, otherwise "in viola-
tion of" Title III within the meaning of § 2515.
Id. at 579. Consequently, the Court remanded Chavez to lower courts for further
proceedings on other undecided issues in the case, not including any further con-
sideration of the Attorney General's actions. Id. at 569-70 n.3.
By contrast, Justice Douglas' dissent qualified the assumption that the Attorney
General had authorized the application by attributing its assertion to the Solicitor
General, id. at 582 (opinion of Douglas, J.). Justice Douglas also quoted the various
Title III documents in footnotes to his opinion, emphasizing the discrepancy be-
tween their representations and the Solicitor General's assertions by the use of italics.
See id. at 582-84 nn.1-5. However, Justice Douglas stated in his opinion that on the
strength of the government's affidavits, both lower courts "held that Mitchell did in
fact authorize the application to be made." In this respect, the dissenters clearly mis-
construed the action of the lower courts. See 478 F.2d at 515.
24Justice White explicitly referred to a "discrepancy between who had actually
authorized the respective applications to be made, and the information transmitted
to the District Court clearly indicating that Assistant Attorney General Wilson was
the authorizing official." 416 U.S. at 566.
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Wilson had not authorized the submission of Title III applica-
tions. The standardized Title III documents used in each case
had unequivocally -asserted that the Attorney General had
specially designated Will Wilson, and that Wilson had per-
sonally authorized each application. In order to preserve these
Title III court orders in the light of Wilson's nonparticipation,
the government was obligated to persuade the reviewing courts
that those representations were incorrect, and that the Attorney
General himself had performed the discretionary act which
section 2516(1) requires. The government was largely suc-
cessful in accomplishing this difficult task, partly because many
reviewing courts were sympathetic to its effort20 5 and partly
due to the ingenuity with which it made its presentations.
The government made its telling disclosures concerning
Will Wilson's non-role and the Attorney General's participation
in a series of carefully orchestrated affidavits, which .asserted
that the Attorney General had "approved" the authorization
request.20 6 The most significant portions of these affidavits
were their conclusory assertions of the legal significance of the
various Title III documents. For example, the standardized
affidavits filed by Will Wilson's two deputies generally asserted
that signing the "Will Wilson" letter was simply a "ministerial
act" and that the letter merely notified the applying attorney
that the Attorney General had acted favorably on his applica-
tion.20 7 Similarly, many of John Mitchell's own affidavits de-
scribed the form memorandum and the "Will Wilson" letter as
simply "part of the procedure developed for transmittal of my
approval to the applicant. ' 20 8 More importantly, the Mitchell
affidavits also stated in firm and confident tones that his act of
initialling the form memorandum "constituted a notification to
the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division that
252 See text accompanying notes 286-87 infra.
206 See, e.g., United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 500-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 846 (1973) (affidavits of John N. Mitchell, Harold P. Shapiro, and Sol
Lindenbaum); United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973, 978-82 (5th Cir. 1973) (en
banc) (affidavits of Sol Lindenbaum, Henry E. Petersen, and Will Wilson); notes 41,
43, 85-87 supra.
211 See notes 41, 85, 206 supra. See also United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1298
n.5 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Doolittle, 341 F.
Supp. 163, 165-66 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
20 See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 500-01 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
846 (1973); United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 650-51 n.7 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163, 170-71 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
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the discretionary action of approving the request ... had been
taken by me.
°2 0 9
Despite what one court described as the "striking" contrast
between these affidavits and the Title III documents submitted
to the issuing judges,210 most courts accepted the affidavits at
face value. They adopted the assertions in the affidavits con-
cerning what the Attorney General had legally accomplished by
initialling the form memorandum without even considering
the meaning of the memorandum's text.2 11 Indeed, some courts
even described the memorandum as effecting a special desig-
nation, but concluded that the Attorney General's initials au-
thorized the application. 212 Other courts refused to construe
the meaning of the memorandum because, in the light of the
government's affidavits, finding that the memorandum accom-
plished only a special designation would "elevate semantics
above reality." 213 Finally, some courts accepted the government's
assertions that the memorandum was ambiguous and relied up-
on the government's affidavits to "clarify" those ambiguities.
21 4
In truth, however, neither the form memorandum nor the
Will Wilson letter is ambiguous. 21 5 To characterize them as
"inartful" or at worst "careless clerical drafting," as the govern-
209 See note 87 supra. See also United States v. Schullo, 363 F. Supp. 246, 252 (D.
Minn. 1973); United States v. Ciamacco, 362 F. Supp. 107, 113 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 491
F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Askins, 351 F. Supp. 408, 418 (D. Md. 1972).
210 United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846
(1973).
211ln re Alperen, 355 F. Supp. 372, 374 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 478 F.2d 194 (1st
Cir. 1973); United States v. DeCesaro, 349 F. Supp. 546, 548 (E.D. Wis. 1972); United
States v. Cantor, 345 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190, 195 (W.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 340 F.
Supp. 1397 (1972).
212 United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230, 234-36 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 417 U.S.
903 (1974); United States v. D'Amato, 340 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
2'1 United States v. Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1973); United
States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 474
F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); see United States v. Fox, 349 F.
Supp. 1258, 1262 (S.D. Il1. 1972) ("form over substance"); United States v. Kohne,
347 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D. Pa. 1972) ("form over substance").
214 United States v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp. 1112, 1113-14 (N.D. Ga. 1973); United
States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163, 167-68 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
1 In contrast to the few courts which have described the form memorandum
addressed to Will Wilson as ambiguous, see note 214 supra, other courts have regarded
its import as perfectly clear. Chavez I, 478 F.2d at 514-15; United States v. Sklaroff,
362 F. Supp. 478, 479-80 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532, 536 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Whitaker,
343 F. Supp. 358, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); see United States v. Cantor, 328 F. Supp. 561, 563-64
(E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1972). The courts also recognize that the
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ment did before the Supreme Court,2 16 strains the limits of
permissible advocacy. The only basis for characterizing these
documents as ambiguous are the flatly contradictory assertions
in the government's affidavits.
Several defendants in the lower courts objected to the use
of these affidavits.21 7 One kind of objection concerned the
nature of the government's proof: that affidavits were an in-
competent form of evidence because their use eliminated any
opportunity for cross-examination,2 1 8 and that the affidavits
included self-serving and legally conclusory statements.
219
Most lower courts which considered these objections re-
jected them without hesitation. They regarded the use of affi-
davits as proper, in some cases citing rule 12(b)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly permits the reso-
lution of collateral issues on the basis of affidavits. 220 The courts
assertions of the "Will Wilson" letter are explicit in their meaning. United States
v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp. 1112, 1114-15 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at
1059-60; see United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 499-502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 846 (1973). On the other hand, at least one court has taken the position that,
standing alone, the government's Title III documents satisfactorily identify the Attor-
ney General as the authorizing officer. United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 652-53
(3d Cir. 1972). See United States v. Ciamacco, 362 F. Supp. 107, 113 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd,
491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973). And, even after considering the Tide III documents and
the affidavits, some courts have ruled that the Attorney General did not authorize a
Title III application, but only specially designated Will Wilson. United States v.
Brown, 351 F. Supp. 38, 40 (W.D.N.C. 1972); United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp.
374 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1972).
Despite these conflicting interpretations of the form memorandum addressed to Will
Wilson, simply reviewing its text makes its purpose perfectly clear. Compare note 20
supra with 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970), quoted in note 6 supra. See also note 182 supra &
accompanying text, and notes 16, 17, 21 supra. Furthermore, the government itself
attached the same interpretation to its Title III documents and, indeed, insisted upon
that interpretation vociferously, until it was compelled to construct a new explanation
for the authorization process to save its Title III proceedings from suppression.
United States v. Sklaroff, 360 F. Supp. 353, 354-61 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Finally, the
Solicitor General conceded before the Supreme Court that the form memorandum
indicated not that the Attorney General had authorized the application, but that
"Wilson himself was designated to review and authorize the application." Chavez II,
416 U.S. at 582 (opinion of Douglas, J.). See Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 6-7.
21 6 Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 71.
217 See, e.g., United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Schullo, 363 F. Supp. 246, 251-53 (D. Minn. 1973); In re Alperen, 355 F. Supp.
372, 374 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 478 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1973).
218 United States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163, 166 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
219 United States v. Bowdach, 474 F.2d 812, 813-14 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556, 558 (D. Conn. 1972). In the case of affidavits filed by
subordinate officials, some defendants also objected to hearsay statements of the
affiants' authority to act. Id.
220 See In re Alperen, 355 F. Supp. 372, 374 n.3 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 478 F.2d 194
(1st Cir. 1973).
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also rejected the demand for cross-examination, reasoning that
the authorization issue only affected the admissibility of the
interceptions and that the sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion does not apply to such a preliminary issue.
221
By and large, these grounds were correct as far as they
went. And it is easy to understand why lower court judges
would be reluctant to order testimony in such cases. The incon-
venience to the officials involved obviously would be enormous,
and a refusal to proceed on the basis of the government's
affidavits might reflect adversely on the integrity or credibility
of the affiants, "our nation's highest law enforcement offi-
cials,''222 something any court would hesitate to do. Finally,
there was undoubtedly a degree of truth to the government's
contention that at least some defendants were demanding oral
testimony by Justice Department officials largely in order to
delay their trials.
223
However, by permitting the government to use its affi-
davits, the lower courts overlooked the self-serving and conclu-
sory nature of their contents. 224 Also, the text of the affidavits
left many questions unanswered. 225 For these reasons one court
of appeals remanded several authorization cases for a full
evidentiary hearing, 226 which revealed several facts about the
221 United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556, 559-60 (D. Conn. 1972); United
States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163, 168-69 (M.D. Ga. 1972); cf. United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-75 (1974). The rejecting courts also cited cases, some in-
volving the authorization question, in which other courts had accepted similar docu-
mentary evidence, United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 878 n.54 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); United States v. Consiglio, supra at 560. At least some of these precedents in
which other courts relied on affidavits, however, involved situations in which the court
had demanded affidavits sua sponte or in which defendants had acceded to their use.
See, e.g., United States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 417
U.S. 903 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1972), re-
manded, 412 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc); cf. United States v. Curreri, 363 F.
Supp. 430, 434-35 (D. Md. 1973).
222 United States v. Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
223 United States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163, 166 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
224 In the Marder hearing, defense counsel objected when former Assistant Attor-
ney General Will Wilson was asked whether the Attorney General had ever authorized
him to approve applications, on the grounds that the question called for a legal con-
clusion. Marder Record, supra note 14, at 266. Judge Mehrtens recognized that the
objection was sound, but permitted Wilson to answer on the grounds that, as an
attorney, his legal opinion was admissible. Id.
225 These questions arose largely because of the conclusory nature of the affidavits.
See, e.g., United States v. Bowdach, 474 F.2d 812, 813-14 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532, 535-36 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See also United States v. Brick,
502 F.2d 219, 226 (8th Cir. 1974) (Bright, J., concurring).
226 United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc); see note
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authorization process which the affidavits had not disclosed. 227
But this hearing only satisfied defense objections to the form of
the government's after-the-fact representations. It did not
overcome the second type of objection which defendants raised
in the lower courts: that the government should not be per-
mitted to disclaim on any kind of after-the-fact basis the explicit
representations by which it had obtained Title III orders. In
one case the defendants justified this assertion by invoking
estoppel doctrine.2 28 More commonly, however, objections of
this sort relied on the well-established rule that the validity of
a warrant must be determined solely on the basis of the infor-
mation presented to the issuing magistrate.22 9
1. Estoppel
The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not properly apply
to the government's change in positions on the Title III au-
thorizations. 230 In United States v. Consiglio, the one case in which
14 supra. See also United States v. Sklaroff, 360 F. Supp. 353, 354-61 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
Another evidentiary hearing was ordered in a subsequent case, United States v.
Bowdach, 474 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1973).
227 Besides demonstrating that the various officials involved in the authorization
process were ignorant or confused about one another's role, see notes 44 & 169 supra,
the testimony revealed that, at Sol Lindenbaum's direction, the Attorney General's
secretaries would occasionally initial the form memoranda addressed to Will Wilson,
Marder Record, supra note 14, at 213-14; and that on one occasion, apparently without
authorization, then Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindeinst also did so. Id.
59, 72, 226.
228 United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1972).
229 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964); Giordenello v. United States,
357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
230 Equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, can be described as estoppel by mis-
representation, A.M.P., Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 452 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 964 (1968); see Henshaw v. Bissell, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 255, 271 (1873); Investors
Syndicate of America, Inc. v. Indian Rocks Beach, 434 F.2d 871, 879 (5th Cir. 1970).
The doctrine is said to apply when, knowing the true facts, the party to be estopped
misrepresents those facts to another with the intention that that other should rely
thereon and the other, being ignorant of the true facts, pursues a certain course of
conduct in reliance upon the misrepresentation, to his detriment. See Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970); Minerals & Chemicals Philipp
Corp. v. Milwhite Co., 414 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 1969); Gestuvo v. District Director,
337 F. Supp. 1093, 1101-02 (C.D. Cal. 1970); United States v. Wilcox, 258 F. Supp. 944,
949 (N.D. Iowa 1966). In contrast to the doctrine of waiver, which can arise by
unilateral conduct, equitable estoppel requires conduct by both parties. Bealle v.
Nyden's, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 86, 93-95 (D. Conn. 1965); see Comment, Waiver and
Estoppel, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 325 (1968). "In a strict and technical sense an estoppel
arises only when a misrepresentation has prejudiced another who has relied upon it."
Deitrich v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 197 (1940). The policies underlying the estoppel
doctrine are said to include preventing fraud and barring the party to be estopped
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defendants raised the doctrine, the district court rejected it
because the defendants could show no reliance upon the
government's original representations. 231 Consequently, rea-
soned the court, when the government offered a new version of
the facts, the defendants suffered no prejudice.
This reasoning was correct. Furthermore, there is some
question whether estoppel ever properly applies against the
government in criminal cases.232 On the other hand, the two
district judges who issued the wiretap orders involved in Con-
siglio did act in reliance upon the government's representations
that Will Wilson had authorized the applications. 233 The Con-
siglio court refused to hold the government to its original rep-
resentations on that basis, reasoning that the government had
obtained no benefit from the misstatements and therefore had
worked no "material fraud" on the court. 34 Of course, to the
extent the government did obtain some institutional benefit by
conducting its authorization procedures in a manner different
than that mandated by Congress, the court's analysis is wrong. 235
Furthermore, estoppel does not necessarily require that the act
from receiving an unconscionable advantage by disavowing prior misrepresentations
upon which an innocent party reasonably relied. Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S.
578, 580-81 (1879); see Morgan v. Chicago & A.R.R., 96 U.S. 716, 720 (1877). The
misrepresentations must be knowingly or at least negligently made; an honest mistake
will not justify imposition of the doctrine. Broussard v. Patton, 466 F.2d 816, 820
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 942 (1973); cf. Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U.S. 279
(1886) (inadvertantly mispleading the location of the defendant's residence will not
bar plaintiff from proving the true residence at trial.)
23, United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556, 560-61 (D. Conn. 1972).
232 The Consiglio court found it unnecessary to decide this issue. Id. at 561. Some
authorities flatly assert that estoppel should not apply to the government in criminal
cases. Dix v. Rollins, 413 F.2d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 1969); State v. Abbott, 64 N.J. Super.
191, 203, 165 A.2d 537, 543 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 36 N.J. 63, 174 A.2d 881
(1961); see Comment, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78 YA[E L.J. 1046
(1969). Other cases suggest that the doctrine will apply to the government under
appropriate circumstances, see Comment, Never Trust A Bureaucrat: Estoppel Against
the Government, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 391, 395-96 (1969); see also Kennedy v. Mendozo-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 157 (1963) (dictum); Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329
U.S. 362, 369 (1946); United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir.
1973); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53, 56-57 (9th Cir. 1970). Several courts have de-
scribed as among those circumstances representations made by government officials
with authority to bind the government while acting within the scope of their employ-
ment. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Hickel, 432 F.2d 587, 591-92 (10th Cir. 1970); see
Parker v. United States, 461 F.2d 806, 809 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Berger, Estoppel Against the
Government, 21 U. CHi. L. REV. 680, 687-88 (1954).
233 342 F. Supp. at 557-58.
234 Id. at 560 n.6.
215 See text accompanying notes 176-84 supra.
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of reliance which triggers the doctrine necessarily benefit the
party estopped.236
More importantly, the Consiglio court failed to consider
that the government made its initial representations under
oath in the course of a judicial proceeding. Those circum-
stances invite application of judicial estoppel or "estoppel by
oath. ' 237 In such cases no showing of reliance by another is
necessary to bind the party estopped;238 the doctrine "is based
solely on public policy which upholds the sanctity of an oath
and precludes a party who has made a sworn statement, even
236 Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 581 (1879). Of course, the receipt of
benefits often does occur in equitable estoppel situations, see, e.g., FPC v. Colorado
Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 502 (1955); Weir v. United States, 474 F.2d 617, 622
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1066 (1973); United States v. Kassan, 208 F. Supp. 858,
861 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
237 The doctrine sometimes is also described as a rule precluding the adoption
of inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings, see Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 222 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964); Note, The
Doctrine of Preclusion Against Inconsistent Positions in Judicial Proceedings, 59 HARV. L. REV.
1132 (1946). Its purpose is "to prevent a litigant from leading a court to find a fact
one way in one proceeding, and then simply because [the litigant's] interests have
changed lead the court to find another way in a subsequent proceeding." Gottesman
v. General Motors Corp., supra at 344; see Colonial Refrigerated Transp. Inc. v.
Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 550 (5th Cir. 1968); Buder v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 345,
349-50 (E.D. Mo. 1971). Some courts suggest the doctrine does not apply unless the
party against whom it is invoked successfully maintained the position initially adopted
to the detriment of the adversary parties. Eads Hide & Wool Co. v. Merrill, 252 F.2d
80, 84 (10th Cir. 1958); Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953);
Parker v. Sager, 174 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Nor does it appear that the
doctrine applies to purely legal claims as opposed to factual assertions, at least until
such time as all reasonable certainty as to which legal claim is correct disappears.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 963 (1964); Robinson v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 144 F. Supp. 713, 717 (W.D.
Mo. 1956). But see Jett v. Zink, 474 F.2d 149, 154-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
854 (1973) (party which initially successfully argued that suit was in personam cannot
subsequently argue that action was only quasi-in rem); W.T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco
Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881, 888-89 (4th Cir. 1963) (SBA cannot simultaneously assert
common law priority rule and prior statutory lien).
238 Some authorities suggest that even the doctrine of judicial estoppel should
not apply unless the party seeking to invoke the doctrine in some way relied to his
detriment upon the position initially taken in a judicial proceeding, see, e.g., Roth v.
McAllister Bros., 316 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1963); Collier v. Granger, 258 F. Supp.
717, 719-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Such a restriction might be appropriate when the party
seeking to invoke the doctrine was not himself party to the first judicial proceeding.
See Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 580-81 (1886); Annot.,'113 A.L.R. 925 (1938).
However, the restriction essentially reflects a confusion between the elements and
purpose of estoppel in pais, see note 230 supra, and the nature of judicial estoppel,
which serves to guard the dignity of judicial proceedings and the sanctity of the oath.
Note, supra note 237, at 1133. In any case it is clear that judicial estoppel applies in
situations in which the injured party has in no way acted in reliance upon the position
initially taken, although a detriment did occur in that the court acted favorably towards
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in another litigation, from repudiating the same when he
thinks it is to his advantage to do so.
' 239
Some authorities suggest that even estoppel by oath does
not apply when the party to be estopped is the government.
240
The rationale of this position is that courts invoke the estoppel
doctrine in order to serve public policy;2 4 1 when the govern-
ment is involved, the public policies which estoppel advances
must be balanced against the public interests which application
of the doctrine will frustrate. 242 Particularly in criminal cases,
runs the argument, the overwhelming public interests in the
conviction of offenders outweigh the interests which estoppel
serves.
2 4 3
This argument may have some merit when applied to
traditional estoppel. It is of considerably less force when ap-
plied to sworn government representations made in judicial
proceedings. Theoretically, at least, the government is subject
to the same standards of accuracy and truthfulness as are other
parties before the courts.244 Justice Douglas asserted in his
Chavez dissent that "[t]he failure of a prosecution in a partic-
ular case pales in comparison with the duty of this Court to
nourish and enhance respect for the evenhanded application
of the law."'245 Furthermore, as one court pointed out, "it is
beyond rational dispute" that the submission by a private party
of false and misleading documents similar to the government's
Title III documents "would be treated as nothing less than con-
tempt of court. '246 Of course, it is unlikely that any court would
the party against whom the doctrine is now invoked. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Gordon v.
Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 369 (1946); Jett v. Zink, 474 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 854 (1973); Kent Homes Inc. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 650, 659 (D. Kan.
1967).
239 Holt v. Southern Ry., 51 F.R.D. 296, 298-99 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); accord, United
States v. Certain Land and Interests in Property, 225 F. Supp. 338, 340-41 (M.D. Tenn.
1964). Although the district court in the latter case described the doctrine as a pecu-
liarity of Tennessee law, id. at 340, the rule of judicial estoppel is, in fact, one of gen-
eral application. See Note, supra note 237, at 1132-33; cases cited in note 237 supra.
But see Hatten Realty Co. v. Baylies, 42 Wyo. 69, 86-94, 290 P. 561, 566-68 (1930).
240 Note, supra note 237, at 1136.
241 See text accompanying note 239 supra.
242 Note, supra note 237, at 1136. See note 232 supra.
243 For an interesting attempt to balance these public interests while still permitting
an estoppet defense in criminal cases, see Comment, YALE L.J., supra note 232.
244 Ritter v. United States, 28 F.2d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 1928); see Berger, supra note
232, at 707; 16 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 274 (1948).
245 Chavez II, 416 U.S. at 599 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
246 United States v. Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 57 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd per
curiam, 496 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
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hold senior Justice Department officials in contempt on this
basis; for that very reason, it should be under an even greater
obligation accurately to represent material facts. It was partly
for this reason that the court of appeals in Chavez imposed the
suppression sanction.247
2. Analogy to Search Warrant Cases
Although no court adopted the judicial estoppel approach,
a few lower courts did, refuse to consider the government's
after-the-fact affidavits by analogy to the rule that search war-
rants cannot be justified except by information presented to the
issuing magistrate. 24 The rationale for this rule is the fourth
amendment requirement that a neutral and detached magis-
trate must decide to issue the warrant on the basis of the sworn
statement of facts and circumstances justifying the intrusion
which a search involves,249 and that consequently the govern-
ment cannot supplement its showing of probable cause by
offering additional evidence after a search has occurred.
250
Functionally at least, this rule approximates the doctrine of
estoppel; but it is based on the Constitution rather than on
public policy. 251 Therefore, the courts are not free to balance
the interests served by the search warrant rule against those
which post-issuance demonstrations of probable cause would
advance.
No provision of the Constitution requires an issuing judge
to identify the authorizing officer in a Title III order; that
requirement is only statutory in nature. Thus, whether a re-
viewing court should consider any information besides that
available to the issuing judge must depend on the degree of
247 Chavez I, 478 F.2d at 517.
248 United States v. Boone, 348 F. Supp. 168, 170 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd, 499 F.2d
551 (4th Cir. 1974); Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1043-44, 1057-58. Another court ex-
pressed disapproval of considering the after-the-fact evidence which resulted from
the Marder hearing, but did so pursuant to the explicit instructions of the court of
appeals. United States v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp. 1112, 1113 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 1973); United
States v. Sklaroff, 360 F. Supp. 353, 361 (N.D. Ga. 1973); see United States v. Acon,
377 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (dictum).
249 Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971).
20See note 229 supra. Note, however, that in the search warrant case, the govern-
ment only seeks to supplement its demonstration of probable cause; in the Title III
situation, the government seeks to make a showing which is inconsistent with its
earlier representations.
251 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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importance Congress attached to the accuracy of the initial
finding. As previously described, substantial evidence exists
that Congress regarded the accurate identification of the au-
thorizing officer in the first instance to be a major safeguard
within the framework of the statute.252 In Chavez, by contrast,
five members of the Supreme Court took a very different view
of the identification requirements. 253 Although Congress saw
fit to write those requirements into the text of the statute itself,
the Supreme Court majority relegated them to a largely horta-
tory status.254 Consequently, although the Court never con-
fronted the issue, it seems unlikely that the majority would
have attached much importance to what evidence reviewing
courts considered when deciding the accuracy of Title III find-
ings on authorization.
However, the point is that although the appellees in Chavez
attempted to raise this issue and although its disposition in
accordance with the estoppel argument or by analogy to the
search warrant rule probably would have required a different
result, the Court simply ignored it. The Court never even con-
sidered whether after-the-fact affidavits should be allowed;
both the majority and the dissent simply adopted the factual as-
sumption of the lower courts that the Attorney General had
personally authorized the relevant Title III application, with-
out examining the grounds for that assumption or the pro-
priety of its use.
B. The Legal-Factual Issue: What Did the
Attorney General Really Do?
The Supreme Court compounded its failure to decide the
evidentiary issues created by the government's use of after-
the-fact affidavits by its additional failure to consider the crucial
substantive issue which that after-the-fact evidence concerned:
252 
See text accompanying notes 118-22 supra; Chavez !, 478 F.2d at 516-17; Focarile,
340 F. Supp. at 1053-57.
253 See text accompanying notes 112-17 supra.
254 After declaring that the court of appeals erred by suppressing Title III evidence
in Chavez on the grounds of misidentification, Justice White commented:
Though we deem this result to be the correct one under the suppression
provisions of Title III, we also deem it appropriate to suggest that strict
adherence by the Government to the provisions of Title III would nonetheless
be more in keeping with the responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it
when authority to engage in wiretapping or electronic surveillance is sought.
416 U.S. at 580.
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Did the Attorney General's actions relating to the form memo-
randum addressed to Will Wilson constitute authorization
within the meaning of section 2516(1)? Even if one takes into
account the after-the-fact evidence which the government
offered in Chavez and other cases, a substantial question still
exists whether the Attorney General properly completed the
discretionary act which the statute requires. Under the provi-
sions of section 2516(1), the Attorney General personally can
act with respect to a Title III application in two different ways:-
Either he can personally decide to authorize the application,
or he can specially designate an Assistant Attorney General to
perform that discretionary act. In Giordano the Supreme Court
ruled that if the Attorney General takes no personal action
whatsoever concerning a Title III application, the resulting
court order is void. In Chavez the Court neglected to consider
what the legal effect of the Attorney General's personal actions
actually was.
To be sure, the after-the-fact evidence which the govern-
ment submitted suggests that the Attorney General personally
reviewed the file concerning the Chavez application and that he
personally initialed the form memorandum addressed to Will
Wilson. 255 And the Attorney General's own sworn statements
assert that the legal effect of his actions was to accomplish the
discretionary act which section 2516(1) requires. 56 However,
putting aside any issue of credibility, 257 such assertions do not
resolve the issue as a matter of law. Some lower courts which
accepted the Attorney General's statements that he personally
initialed the form memorandum disagreed with his assertions
concerning its legal effect. 258 Certainly, to the extent the Attor-
ney General's assertions concerning the legal effect of his
actions represent his expert opinion, they are not binding on
the courts. 259 Nor does it appear that they are any more con-
clusive as statements of his intent when he initialed the form
memorandum. In either case a question remains for adjudica-
2.5 The record in Giordano and Chavez consisted not only of the affidavits which
the government had submitted to the lower courts in those cases, but also the transcript
of the Marder hearing. Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 5 n.2.256 See note 87 supra; Marder Record, supra note 14, at 36-57.
257 Cf. United States v. Schullo, 363 F. Supp. 246, 253 (D. Minn. 1973).
2258 United States v. Boone, 348 F. Supp. 168, 170-71 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd, 499
F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 374, 375 (M.D. Pa.),
rev'd sub nor. United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1972).
2.9 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974).
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tion: Did the Attorney General's actions satisfy the statutory
requirements?
The Supreme Court did not recognize this issue.260 It
simply assumed that the Attorney General had satisfied the
statute, and decided Chavez on that basis. 261 However, there
are at least two aspects of the Attorney General's actions which
appear to fall short of the statute's requirements, either one of
which might require rejecting the Chavez order for lack of au-
thorization.
The first aspect concerns Congress' purpose. The legisla-
tive history strongly suggests that Congress regarded the au-
thorization requirement as a means of ensuring restraint in
the use of electronic surveillance. 262 Congress intended that
the Attorney General or one of his nine Assistants personally
should take responsibility for devising the Justice Department's
policies for invoking Title III procedures, and should apply
those policies in each and every case. 263 The Supreme Court
recognized this congressional purpose when it commented in
Giordano that the authorization requirement, as Congress con-
ceived of it, "would inevitably foreclose resort to wiretapping
in various situations where investigative personnel would other-
wise seek intercept authority from the court and the court
would very likely authorize its use.
2 6 4
It is equally clear what policies of restraint Congress had
in mind. Although it regarded court-authorized electronic
interceptions as constitutionally permissible, Congress did not
want them employed in every case which technically fell within
the parameters of the statute. The primary justification for
260 It is important to note that the only two courts which explicitly considered this
issue, one on the basis of the Marder testimony, see note 14 supra, concluded that the
Attorney General did authorize Title III applications by initialling the form memo-
randum and did so in a manner which satisfied the statute. United States v. Bowdach,
366 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1973); United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358
(E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953
(1973). However, in both cases, the courts reached that conclusion by ignoring the
explicit text of the form memorandum and by relying on the conclusory affidavits
which had caused the court of appeals in Bowdach to remand the case for an evi-
dentiary hearing, see note 226 supra, as well as on the equally conclusory testimony of
the Marder witnesses. United States v. Bowdach, supra at 1371-72; United States v.
Whitaker, supra at 360.
26 See note 203 supra.
262 See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
263 United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 503 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846
(1973); see note 181 supra.
264 Giordano II, 416 U.S. at 528.
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electronic surveillance was the necessity to combat organized
crime. 26 5 Congress wanted the Attorney General or his desig-
nated Assistant Attorney General to determine in each case
whether the use of Title III was appropriate in light of the
nature of the offense or the identity of the offenders.266
The Attorney General himself did not approve or disap-
prove applications on this basis. He repeatedly stated that his
only concern was that the application and supporting papers
satisfy the statutory standards of probable cause and neces-
sity.2 67 Indeed, the government argued in some lower court
cases that it did not matter how carefully the Attorney General
conducted this review because, ultimately, the issuing judge
would make those same determinations.
68
265 The Senate Report flatly states that the major purpose of Title III is to combat
organized crime. S. REP., supra note 3, at 2157. Furthermore, much of the Report
is devoted to a description of the dangers which organized crime poses. Id. 2157-61.
See also A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 4,
at 260-78. Control of organized crime is also listed in the Report as one determinant
of which federal crimes would be identified in § 2516(1) as appropriate for Title III
interceptions. S. REP., supra note 3, at 2186. Most importantly, Congress included in
the body of the statute itself an explicit finding that the interception of communi-
cations relating to organized criminal activities was "an indispensible aid to law en-
forcement and the administration of justice." Pub. L. 90-351, Title III, § 801(c), 82
Stat. 211 (also in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 note (1970)). See United States v. King, 478 F.2d
494, 505-06 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973).
266 Giordano II, 416 U.S. at 527; United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 503 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973).
26 7 Marder Record, supra note 14, at 63-64, 70-71, 74. Although the affidavits
of John Mitchell and Sol Lindenbaum make reference to the Attorney General's
policies in relation to the use of Title III, those policies were never promulgated in
any formal sense, see note 44 supra. Rather, "the guidelines that actually evolved con-
sisted of decisions made on previous applications, which served as precedents to
guide Mr. Lindenbaum's actions in the cases in which he acted on behalf of the Attor-
ney General." Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 55 n.38.
At the Marder hearing, Lindenbaum and Petersen testified that the Attorney
General's policies included limiting the use of Title III to organized crime or other
serious cases. Marder Record, supra note 14, at 136, 220-21. But Lindenbaum's testi-
mony suggested that whether the use of Title III was necessary or appropriate in an
individual case was not a consideration after the first few proceedings, id. 220, and the
Attorney General, when asked if he made a determination whether the use of elec-
tronic interceptions was necessary in each case, replied that he reviewed the deter-
mination of the Criminal Division as to necessity and "obviously, there was a need or
otherwise the application would not have been sent up to me." Id. 67.
None of this evidence suggests that, as an institution, the Department of Justice
failed carefully to review Title III applications, or that the Attorney General did not
review the files as well. Id. 63, 119, 121. What it does suggest is that the Attorney
General did not formulate a policy of restraint and personally decide in each case
whether the circumstances justified the extraordinary intrusions permitted by elec-
tronic surveillance techniques.
268See, e.g., United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
See also Giordano Brief, supra note 17, at 30-33, 43-46. This view differs remarkably
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Of course, questions may exist concerning the extent to
which courts may properly review the mental processes of an
executive branch officer when he exercises quasi-judicial func-
tions, 269 but some lower courts did conclude that Congress
intended the authorizing officer to conduct a "sentient review"
of each Title III application, 270 and two judges made a deter-
mination whether such a review occurred. 271 Moreover, in
United States v. United States District Court the government con-
ceded that courts could properly review the criteria by which
the Attorney General determined that domestic security con-
siderations required the employment of electronic surveil-
lance.272 Indeed, in that case Justice White argued in a con-
curring opinion that the reasons for the Attorney General's
authorization of those wiretaps, as indicated by his own affi-
davit, did not satisfy the statutory criteria upon which the
government asserted its authority to act without judicial ap-
proval.273
from the views of Senator John McClellan, one of Title III's chief proponents. Com-
menting upon the experience of the first year following enactment of Title III,
Senator McClellan asserted that "the opponents of this legislation who predicted
widespread and promiscuous use of wiretaps and bugs by law enforcement authorities
are being proven wrong in their prognostications." 115 CONG. REc. 23,238 (1969).
But see note 13 supra. He also noted that the prosecutorial screening process estab-
lished by the statute appeared to be having a healthy effect on the number of appli-
cations submitted to the courts, and stated that "[o]ur thought was that mandating
prosecutor involvement in the warrant process would strengthen it by guaranteeing
that the decision to use these techniques would be preceded by a careful law enforce-
ment screening process." Id. 23,240.
26. See United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Conn. 1972); United
States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163, 169 (M.D. Ga. 1972) (quoting United States v.
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941)). But see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
270 United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1113 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also
text accompanying notes 263-64 supra.
27 United States v. O'Neill, 497 F.2d 1020, 1026 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. 1368, 1371-72 (S.D. Fla. 1973). Even with respect to dis-
cretionary decisions by judges themselves, the federal courts have considered whether
the deciding judge applied the appropriate standards. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 697-702 (1974) (whether district judge improperly applied criteria under rule
17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443 (1972) (whether district judge improperly relied during sentencing upon
prior counselless convictions); United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959)
(whether district judge properly exercised discretion in refusing to consider probation
because defendant pleaded not guilty and demanded trial).
272 Brief for Petitioner at 21-23, United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972). The government conceded that the Attorney General's deter-
mination was properly subject to judicial review, but argued that such a review should
be strictly limited to whether the Attorney General's determination was arbitrary or
capricious. Id.
273 407 U.S. at 341 (White, J., concurring).
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If Justice White had subjected the documentation of the
Attorney General's purported approval of Title III applications
to the same close scrutiny in Chavez, he might well have con-
cluded that those documents did not demonstrate that the
discretionary decision which Congress intended authorizing
officers to make had actually occurred. The Attorney General's
statements that he was concerned only with probable cause
and with form belie any policy of restraint at his level.
Even if the Court had considered this issue and had con-
cluded that the requisite sentient review had occurred, how-
ever, there is another questionable aspect of the government's
authorization procedure which the Supreme Court did not
consider. Section 2516(1) requires an appropriate authorizing
officer to approve submission of a Title III application to the
issuing court. Other provisions of the statute indicate the in-
tention of Congress that the applying attorney receive notice of
authorization before appearing before the court.2 74 However,
the misrepresentations involved in the government's standard-
ized Title III documents frustrated that purpose. When apply-
ing attorneys asserted to issuing judges that Will Wilson had
authorized their applications, they were in error. Assuming
the government's revised version of what actually occurred
within the Justice Department is correct, the question remains:
Did the Attorney General effectively authorize the applying
attorneys to proceed even though they did not know it?
Most courts never considered this issue because they gen-
erally regarded the misrepresentations concerning the autho-
rization process either as dispositive or as irrelevant.2 75 How-
ever, in United States v. Vasquez, 276 the district court voided a
Title III court order despite the Attorney General's personal
participation in the authorization process because neither the
applying attorney nor the issuing court ever knew that the
Attorney General had acted. The court's reasoning on this
point is instructive:
I suppose all would agree that if the Attorney General
one morning said to himself that he had decided to
274 Such an intention is implicit in the requirements that the applying officer
must state under oath the identity of the authorizing officer and that the issuing judge
must identify the authorizing officer in the interception order itself. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2581(l)(a), 2518(4)(d) (1970).
275 See text accompanying notes 91-98 supra.
276 348 F. Supp. 532 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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authorize [the applying attorney] to apply for a wire-
tap order, this, of itself, would not constitute the au-
thorization required by the statute. Do we have sub-
stantially more here? Assuming the Attorney General
did make such a decision in his own mind and com-
municated it to Mr. Lindenbaum, the current aware-
ness stopped there. Mr. Petersen had no such knowl-
edge ....
[The applying attorney] certainly was not told that
the Attorney General had made the decision ....
The statute (section 2518) [sic] says that the
Attorney General "... may authorize an application
to a Federal judge . . ." I do not see how there can be
an effective "authorization" under such statute if
neither the person making the application nor the
judge to whom he applies is aware of the existence of
that authorization. 277
There is little question that under standard agency law the
government attorneys who submitted Title III applications to
the federal courts on the basis of "Will Wilson" letters had
apparent authority to do so. 278 Furthermore, given the Attor-
ney General's subsequent disclosure that he had personally
approved the applications, those attorneys probably possessed
actual authority as well. 279 However, Congress did not enact
the authorization requirements of section 2516(1) simply to
ensure that Title III applications were authorized in the tradi-
tional principal-agency sense. Congress wanted to be certain
that no attorney would even submit an application until he
received prior approval from a politically responsive, senior
277 Id. at 536.
278 Apparent authority exists when a principal acts in a manner which causes a
third party reasonably to believe that the principal has authorized the agent to per-
form a certain act. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27, at 103 (1958). Such ap-
parent authority arises, for example, when the principal asserts in a letter that the agent
possesses the authority, and a copy of the letter is formulated to the third party; or
when the principal authorizes the agent to represent to the third party that the au-
thority to perform the act exists. Id. 103-06.
279 Actual authority would not exist, according to the Restatement, unless the Attor-
ney General had satisfactorily manifested his intent that the applying attorneys should
submit their Title III applications by conduct which came to the attention of. the
applying attorneys. Id. 100-0 1. The procedure which the Justice Department employed
did communicate that intention, but misrepresented whose intention it was. However,
such a mistake of fact would not destroy the authority of the applying attorneys under
standard agency law if the Attorney General assumed responsibility for such factual
errors. Id. 137-38.
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official of the Department of Justice. In a functional sense,
deeming Title III applications to be properly authorized on
the basis of the Attorney General's after-the-fact declarations
is no different than approving the ratification by the Attorney
General of an already submitted application, something which
the courts have declared to be improper. 80 By tolerating a
situation in which government attorneys could mistakenly
submit applications in the good faith belief that they had re-
ceived an Assistant Attorney General's approval and invali-
dating some while sustaining others solely on the basis of the
Attorney General's "ex post facto affidavit, '81 the Supreme
Court ignored the congressional intention that the provisions
of Title III prevent abuses before they occurred, not just repair
those which had already happened.282 As one court noted,
It hardly fulfills the expressed intent of Congress to
say that the true lines of responsibility may now be
traced by means of affidavits submitted almost two
years later by the Department of Justice for the pur-
pose of contradicting the documents upon the basis of
which the wiretap order was requested and issued.
2 3
Finally, it bears repeating that the best evidence of what
the Attorney General actually accomplished when he initialed
the form memorandum is the text of the memorandum itself.
To the extent the memorandum is ambiguous, consideration of
other factors, including the Attorney General's own statements
of what he intended, would be proper. But if, as numerous
courts have suggested, the purpose of the memorandum is
perfectly clear,28 4 there is no legitimate reason to permit the
government to controvert its contemporaneous statements of
what it intended. Nevertheless, like many lower courts, the
Supreme Court accepted the government's after-the-fact ex-
planations, ignoring the Justice Department's posture as a
somewhat desperate advocate. It thereby unquestioningly re-
solved in the government's favor an important issue in the case
and transformed the straightforward statements of the govern-
ment's Title III documents into a sophist's delight, in which no
210 Giordano II, 416 U.S. at 523-24 n.12.
281 Chavez 11, 416 U.S. at 588 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
282 United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 545 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd in part,
478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973).
283 United States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532, 537 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
284 See note 215 supra.
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word means what it says unless the speaker later chooses to
make it so.
CONCLUSION
The manner in which most lower courts decided Title III
misidentification cases demonstrates the ability of judges to
evade the obvious and to foster the bizarre. In order to secure
Title III court orders the government submitted sworn repre-
sentations that Will Wilson had personally authorized sub-
mission of each application and substantiated those represen-
tations by what purported to be Wilson's personal letters.
Subsequently, in order to sustain the Title III orders despite
the inaccuracy of those representations, the government con-
tended that the Attorney General himself had authorized the
applications and that Wilson's only role was "a messenger-
type function which, under the statute at least, could have been
performed by anyone. ' 285 Furthermore, the government also
claimed that the form memorandum, the text of which in-
structed Wilson to perform a discretionary act, itself consti-
tuted performance of the act, thus making the instruction
unnecessary. 286 Despite their implausibility, however, these
assertions succeeded in most federal courts.
One would be naive to believe that the government suc-
ceeded in so many cases by the simple force of logic. It is far
more likely that many lower court judges accepted the govern-
ment's contentions because refusing to do so would require
the suppression of incriminating evidence of major federal
crimes because of a statutory deviation. A number of courts
suggested that under such circumstances the costs of suppres-
sion were too high.287 Furthermore, several courts which
imposed the suppression sanction did so with obvious regret
and in some cases bitterly castigated the Justice Department
officials whose conduct had made such a disposition neces-
sary. 2
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285 Focarile, 340 F. Supp. at 1053.
286 See United States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532, 536 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
287 The most explicit example of this suggestion is United States v. Kohne, 347
F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D. Pa. 1972), in which the court concluded that the Justice
Department's authorization process was proper and observed, "[T]o hold otherwise
would be to put form over substance and would negate the countless hours spent
by law enforcement officials gathering evidence for this case."
288 United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 505 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846
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Those courts which condoned the government's conduct
in order to avoid suppressing electronic interceptions improp-
erly balanced the considerations involved. To be sure, the
evidence involved in many cases was essential to the conviction
of often sinister defendants. However, the countervailing
considerations-the interests which Congress sought to pro-
tect-were not simply conformity to a statutorily required but
otherwise pointless bureaucratic procedure. On the contrary,
Congress intended to safeguard privacy itself. As the district
court commented in finally disposing of the very first authori-
zation case, the strict limitations established in Title III are
essential to the statute's purpose:
One must not lose sight amidst all the debate, which
superficially appears to center around a contest of
words, that we are dealing here with a power which
has, for by far the greatest part of our history, been
forbidden to government under all but the very most
limited circumstances. We are dealing with an awe-
some power which strikes directly at the heart of the
right to privacy, which has been elevated in other
contexts to the highest level of constitutional protec-
tion. That the power legitimately exists at all is beyond
the understanding of many of our great legal and con-
stitutional minds.2
8 9
The Supreme Court did not dispose of the misrepresenta-
tions in the government's Title III documents by adopting
the approach of most lower courts. But it accomplished the
same result. Instead of dismissing the government's misstate-
ments as irrelevant or harmless error, the Court properly
labeled them as violations of the statute. However, the majority
avoided suppressing evidence on this basis by a novel con-
struction of Title III's statutory suppression sanction, which
limited its applicability to only those statutory violations which
the Court regarded as central.
(1973); Giordano 1, 469 F.2d at 531; United States v. Stanley, 360 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) (describing the case as part of "the continuing saga of the Government's
gross carelessness" with respect to Title III applications); United States v. Robinson,
359 F. Supp. 52, 54 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd per curian, 496 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1974)
(en banc); United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 374, 375 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd sub nor.
United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1972).
2. United States v. Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 57 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd per
curiam, 496 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
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In so doing, both the majority and the dissenters over-
looked several important issues, despite the appellees' efforts
to raise them. In particular, the Court ignored the intentional
nature of the institutional misconduct which caused govern-
ment attorneys to make sworn misstatements concerning the
authorization process when seeking Title III court orders.
The Supreme Court also erred in not scrutinizing the
government's characterizations of the Attorney General's own
actions in cases in. which he personally participated in the au-
thorization process. This uncritical acceptance of the govern-
ment's after-the-fact representations was not unusual, and
there are legitimate reasons for such an approach in most cases
in which the Department of Justice makes positive factual
assertions concerning the conduct of government officials.
But in the authorization cases, whether the Attorney General's
actions satisfied section 2516(1) was an issue of law. And cau-
tion would have been particularly appropriate because the
record in these cases included incontrovertible evidence that
Justice Department officials had taken extraordinary liberties
with the statutory protections Congress had created to pro-
tect personal privacy against surreptitious intrusions by elec-
tronic means.
29 0
In Giordano the Supreme Court properly suppressed Title
III evidence which the government had obtained without
authorization by any appropriate Justice Department official.
However, in Chavez a majority of the Court substantially dimin-
ished the statutory protections which Congress mandated to
enforce the authorization requirement. The result is hard to
reconcile with the Court's own acknowledgement that Congress
intended to permit electronic interceptions only in strict con-
formity to the stringent requirements of the statute.
More difficult to assess is the long range significance of
the Court's decisions.- In one sense the authorization cases
were sui generis. They involved the propriety of an approval
procedure which the Justice Department has since disavowed,
and, unless the Court chooses to consider authorization deci-
sions by the various acting Attorneys General who followed
John N. Mitchell into office, 2 91 it will probably never again
2""0See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189, 192 n.7 (5th Cir. 1972),
remanded, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
2 . 1 See note 10 supra.
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consider the authorization and identification requirements of
Title III. On the other hand, the Court's construction of Title
III's statutory suppression sanction affects enforcement of
the entire Act. The lower courts have been quick to adopt the
Supreme Court's description of section 2518(10)(a) as applying
only to violations of those Title III provisions which directly
and substantially implement the central safeguards of the Act.
In one case the District of Columbia Court of Appeals relied
upon this formula to reject the government's argument that
its failure to disclose the existence of prior applications did not
necessitate disclosure. 292 However, other courts have relied
upon the same formula to deny suppression despite a violation
of Title III's post-interception procedural requirements 293 or
to limit the suppression sanction to those cases in which the
government committed a Title III violation willfully rather
than through inadvertance.2 94 These decisions suggest that the
lower courts will accept the Supreme Court's invitation to "pick
and choose" among the different provisions of Title III, sup-
pressing evidence in some cases and refusing suppression in
others. Such a trend can only further weaken the ability of the
statute to protect individual privacy in the manner Congress
intended.
292 United States v. Bellosi, 501 F.2d 833, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
293 United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1974); cf. United States
v. John, No. 72-1565 (8th Cir., Jan. 6, 1975) (finding no violation of post-interception
procedural requirements of § 2518(8)(d)).
294 United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1974).
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